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Abstract

Information warfare (IW) has developed into a significant threat to the national
security of the United States. Our critical infrastructures are linked together by
information systems in a way that is unprecedented in time and is increasingly vulnerable
to information attack. However, beneath all the technical means of instigating or
defending against such an attack lies the individual decision-maker. This study seeks to
understand sum of those factors which affect the ability of an individual to make accurate
decisions in an information warfare environment.
The study used game theory to analyze the behavior of decision-makers within an
IW simulation. The information warfare game model is based on a set of games known
as infinitely repeated games of incomplete information. It uses the Bayesian Nash
equilibrium concept to determine the strategy which a player should use repeatedly in
order to maximize his or her payoff.
The results of the experiment show that when a person is faced with increasing
numbers of potential strategies, he or she is less likely to make an accurate decision. The
results also show that decision-makers that are faced with budgetary constraints and
forced to pay for alternative strategies tend to pick those strategies which are most
expensive. This is regardless of the actual utility of the strategy as long as it is within the
decision-makers' allotted budget. Additionally, the study found that the rationality of the
decisions made by an opponent did not significantly affect a player's ability to find the
strategy that maximizes his or her own payoff.

THE EFFECTS OF BUDGETARY CONSTRAINTS, MULTIPLE STRATEGY
SELECTION, AND RATIONALITY ON EQUILIBRKJM ATTAINMENT IN AN
INFORMATION WARFARE SIMULATION

I. Introduction

Problem Statement
The United States and the U.S. military are highly dependent on their information
systems. The President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection (1997) found
eight critical U.S. infrastructures which if attacked could result in serious harm to the
United States. These infrastructures include telecommunications, transportation,
electrical power systems, water supply systems, gas and oil storage and transportation,
emergency services, banking and finance, and continuity of government services.
Because of the interlinked nature of these information systems, they are increasingly
vulnerable to information attack by malicious hackers, terrorist groups, rogue nations, and
traditional adversaries (Robinson, 98).
The vulnerability of military information systems has been demonstrated on at
least two separate occasions. The first occurred in 1997 when the National Security
Agency (NSA) conducted a red team exercise called "Eligible Receiver" (Denning, 1999:
75). The NSA concluded that during the exercise, red team hackers were able to
penetrate military information systems to a point where they could have disrupted and
delayed troop movements. The second demonstration came in 1999 at the outbreak of

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) operations against Serbia. According to
Rapaport (1999), Serbian hackers launched a cyber attack against a NATO web server
which managed to paralyze one of NATO's Sun Sparc 20 servers. Though the attack was
militarily insignificant, the Serbian attack as well as other incidents do underscore the
need for a method to analyze information warfare (IW) attacks and the decisions made by
those involved.

Theory
Burke (1999) proposed game theory as a means to model information warfare in
order to analyze the most common strategies used in IW as well as the human behavior
affecting those strategies. Burke created an information warfare game model based on
the Nash and Bayesian equilibrium concepts to predict behavior and analyze the decisions
made in conducting information warfare. The goal of those playing the game is to
maximize their utility. A player achieves this by discovering and repeatedly playing the
one strategy or combination of strategies that maximizes his or her expected payoff. The
utility of the game theory model is based on the ability to measure the player's level of
equilibrium attainment. If the game model is unable to measure the player's or the
majority of the players' attainment of equilibrium, then the game model is of little use for
predicting human behavior. This study seeks to further Burke's research with the goal of
refining the equilibrium calculations in order to better predict human behavior. It also
seeks to make enhancements to the game model to better reflect the environment in which
information operations are conducted.

Research Questions
The objective of this study is to develop enhancements to the IW Game Model
developed by Burke (1999) and thereby improve its ability to predict human behavior.
This is accomplished by making four changes to the game model that not only enhance
the model but also suggest new issues for study. The changes include: 1) adding
budgetary constraints, 2) allowing multiple strategy selection, 3) adding rational vs.
irrational opponent play, and 4) making changes to the equilibrium calculations.
Research Question 1: Do budgetary constraints placed on a player affect his or her
ability to find and use an equilibrium strategy? Hardly any organization exists without
budgetary constraints. This is true of any organization conducting information attack or
defense, including the Department of Defense and its adversaries. Rarely does a
decision-maker have all of the resources wanted or required to find and implement the
ideal strategy as quickly as desired.
Research Question 2: Does the ability to implement more than one strategy at a
time affect the player's ability to find and use an equilibrium strategy? In reality, many
strategies are often studied for implementation. Often, one strategy alone is found to be
lacking and consequently a combination of different strategies is implemented (Cohen,
1999). Furthermore, the implementation is usually parallel rather then sequential. For
this reason, the game model should allow players to implement any combination of
strategies at once instead of in sequential turns. Further, an additional strategy available
to a player may be to choose to implement no strategy if he is low on funds.

Research Question 3: Is a player who faces a rational opponent more or less likely
to discover and play the equilibrium strategy than a player who faces an irrational
opponent? It is not guaranteed that all individuals or organizations wishing to conduct
information warfare will act in a rational manner. In fact, it could be argued that terrorist
organizations such as those that commit suicide bombings are irrational by nature. This
study addresses this limitation by controlling the rationality of the subject's opponent.
Research Question 4: Does calculating equilibrium as a percentage of total game
play provide a better measurement of equilibrium attainment than calculating the number
of rounds to reach equilibrium (NORRE)? The original equilibrium calculation by Burke
(1999) estimated a player's ability to find and play the equilibrium strategy by
determining at which round of game play the decision-maker started to play only the
equilibrium strategy. This provided the number of rounds to reach equilibrium and was
the primary measurement for the model. The NORRE calculation will still be performed;
however, it will only serve as additional information and comparison. It will not serve as
the primary measure of equilibrium attainment.

Research Design
The research was conducted using a within-subjects and between-subjects analysis
of variance (ANOVA) research design, which used a complete 2x2x2 factorial
experiment. The experiment consisted of a pretest-posttest control group design (true
experiment), as defined by Dooley (1999). It included 8 treatment groups comprising all
the possible combinations of factors.

Assumptions and Limitations
Although the experiment controls the rationality of a player's opponent, this
model assumes that all the subjects (defenders) in the experiment are rational. That is,
they will act in a rational manner to maximize their expected payoff. This is also a
possible limitation of the study because it does not guarantee that all subjects will play in
a rational manner.
The maximization of expected payoffs is further complicated by the fact that not
all payoffs are of a monetary nature as depicted in the model. Therefore, the model
assumes that the monetary payoff includes any and all benefits a player receives for his
actions. This includes but is not limited to actual monetary gains, political gains, and
personal prestige and satisfaction.
Applicability
Warfare of any kind is ultimately a social endeavor. Though we spend billions of
dollars building technological wonders, the decisions of which ones to build, as well as
where, how and when to use them, rest with human beings. General George S. Patton
knew that part of success in battle is dependent upon knowing your enemy and the
reasons why he or she makes his or her decisions. This is why General Patton regularly
studied the actions of great military leaders, including those of his enemy Field Marshal
Erwin Rommel (Essame: 1974). By studying Rommel's book Infantry Attacks, General
Patton could predict and account for the decisions that Rommel or any other skilled

tactician would be likely to make (Allen: 1979). As in traditional battle, knowing how
and why humans make the decisions they make is crucial to the information warrior.
This study furthers prior research in the field by showing yet another way which
game theory can be used to study human behavior. It focuses on budgetary constraints,
multiple strategy selection, and opponent rationality as they pertain to three specific
strategies. This, however, is not the extent of applicability. The model can easily be
adapted to a wide variety of strategies or levels of conflict. For example, instead of
defending single organizational systems, the model could seek to study overall strategies
taken by the United States to defend our national information infrastructure against other
nation states or terrorist organizations by studying their possible strategies and predicted
behaviors.

Preview
Chapter II presents a general description of both game theory, as applied to the IW
game model, and strategies available to information warfare and their supporting
literature. The section on game theory includes a detailed description of the formulas
used to calculate success probabilities and expected payoffs in a multiple strategy
selection environment. Chapter HI describes the methodology used to conduct and
analyze the experiment. Chapter IV provides the analysis of the experiment. Chapter V
discusses the results as well as their significance and provides recommendations for
future research. As a prelude to discussing the nature of game theory and the information

warfare game model the next chapter starts with a brief introduction to relevant strategies
within the information warfare field.

II. Literature Review

Introduction
This chapter is broken into four main sections. The first section provides a basic
overview of information warfare strategies and operations. The second section provides
an overview of game theory and how it has been used in the past to predict human
behavior. The third section provides an explanation of the information warfare game
model and basic game theory concepts as applied to the model. The final section
describes enhancements to the game model and their associated hypotheses based on the
research questions posed in Chapter I.

Information Warfare
As noted in Chapter I, the information warfare game model can be used to analyze
a multitude of differing IW threats and strategies at differing levels. Various authors such
as Denning (1999), White (1998), Schwartau (2000), and Cohen (2000) have described
these threats in a multitude of ways. This section describes those threats as well as
proposed counter strategies for the information security professional seeking to defend his
or her system.
Denning (1999) describes IW threats in terms of operations, which affect the
value of the resource attacked. After an attack is made, a resource has the possibility to
either gain or lose value to the defender as well as the possibility to gain in value to the

attacker. According to Denning, a number of different operations cause this change in
value. Although presented below with their most likely outcome, it is important to note
that the operations are not mutually exclusive. Each operation does have the potential to
cause more than one outcome to occur dependent upon its application.
The first outcome possible is an increase in availability of the information
resource to the offensive player. According to Denning (1999: 32-33), there are five
different types of operations that attain this outcome including "espionage and
intelligence operations", "information piracy", "penetration into physical premises and
computer systems", "superimposition fraud", and "identity theft." In all cases, the
attacker gains use of the defenders resources. However, this does not necessarily mean
that the defender loses use of his or her resources, as is the case in the next scenario.
Denning's (1999: 34) second outcome of an information attack involves the
decrease in availability of a resource to the defensive player. This type of attack is
commonly known as a denial of service attack and takes the form of three types of
operations, "physical theft, sabotage, and censorship." This type of attack may or may not
result in the attacker gaining use of the resource.
The third type of possible outcome described by Denning results in a decrease in
the integrity of the resource. This includes "tampering, penetration and fabrication"
operations. The goal of this type of operation is to manipulate the information in the
system without the knowledge of the user. This creates the possibility of the user making
erroneous decisions based on bad information.

White (1998: 7-8) has a similar view on threats to information security, which can
be closely matched to Denning's "outcomes". White characterizes IW threats in terms of
objectives of the "cyber-terrorist". White's objectives include the "destruction, alteration,
or acquisition and retransmission of data/commands." These objectives are attained by
using a myriad of different electronic tools (virus, worm, logic bomb, bot), extortion, or
social engineering. However, as shown by the next author these same tools can be used
in information attacks at a number of different levels.
Schwartau (2000: 3) explains these levels in a slightly different view of the
classification of IW threats. He breaks information operations and the threats that they
present into three classes based on their intensity. Schwartau defines Class I as
operations aimed at individuals, such as identity theft or blackmail. Class II is defined as
industrial and economic espionage, which includes operations such as electronic
eavesdropping, hacking, and sniffing. Class III is defined as operations conducted by
nation states or against nation states. This would include attacks against our national
information infrastructure by an individual hacker, a terrorist group, or a nation state.
In written testimony before the Joint Economic Committee of the U.S. Congress,
Cohen (2000) stated that the risks to our information systems come from a "combination
of threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences." Much like the "outcomes" of Denning
(1999) and the "objectives" of White (1998), Cohen (2000) breaks IW threats into
possible "consequences" of an information attack. These consequences include affecting
the confidentiality, the availability, and the integrity of information systems.
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Given that these three factors correspond well to those of Denning and White,
they will serve as the basis for the information warfare game model. Therefore, attackers
and defenders playing the IW game will be able to perform operations to affect the
integrity, availability, or confidentiality of the information system and are defined as
follows:

1. Integrity Operations: The goal of this strategy is often to effect the operations of
the system without the knowledge of the user. This strategy involves operations
that penetrate the information systems, tamper with the systems, and fabricate and
/ or modify data within the systems.

2. Availability Operations: This type of operation is commonly known as a denial
of service attack. It differs from an integrity attack in that it overtly halts
operations instead of controlling the output of operations (Cohen 2000). The
attacker is not concerned with forcing the user to make erroneous decisions based
on bad data but to ensure that the user get no use out of the system at all. It takes
the form of three types of operations: physical theft of hardware, sabotage either
physically or logically, and censorship.

3. Confidentiality Operations: The goal of a confidentiality operation is to gather
sensitive information. Five different types of operations attain this outcome
including: espionage and intelligence operations, information piracy, penetration
into physical premises and computer systems, identity theft, and superimposition
fraud (use of a stolen identity to charge goods or services).
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Now that the strategies or courses of action are broken down into their basic parts
and defined, they can flow directly into the information warfare game model. As shown
in the following sections, game theory is a method of mathematically modeling complex
social interactions. It allows a player to implement the strategies defined above in order
to maximize his or her expected payoff and in so doing reveal the reasons surrounding
their decision process.

Game Theory Overview
First developed by Von Neuman and Morgenstern (1944), game theory was
originally designed to model economic activities. It involves two or more players
determining courses of action based on a set of strategies, each with its own payoff
function. Each player must base his decisions on his beliefs about the other player's
intentions (Harsanyi, 1995). The overall goal of the game is for each player to choose
strategies, which maximize his or her expected utility. That is to say, that each player
wants to receive the most beneficial payoff at the end of each round that he or she can.
Since its inception, game theory has evolved beyond its original purpose of
modeling economic situations. Now game theory involves modeling complex
interactions in a number of different disciplines including the political and social sciences
(Lichbach 1990). Over the years, game theory proved to be an effective way to analyze
the decisions people make, and to determine the factors that influence those decisions.
There has been considerable work done using game theory to analyze complex
negotiations. Aumann and Maschler (1995) showed how game theory was used to model
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nuclear disarmament negotiation between the United States and the Soviet Union. Like
information warfare, the negotiations were games of incomplete information where one
side never really new the underlying objectives of the other. Zeager and Bascom (1997)
developed a game model to analyze the negotiations between the United Nations High
Commission for Refugees and nation states for the repatriation of refugees to the
countries of origin.
Game theory has also been used to analyze situations of conflict. Leathom (1971)
used non-zero sum games to model air combat situations. In another study, Healy and
Wantchekon (1999) created a two-sided incomplete information game to determine the
factors that would lead a nation state to use torture as a method to extract information or
to control the society. Most recently, however, and as described in the next section Burke
(1999) showed that a number of factors within the realm of game theory lend themselves
nicely to the modeling of information warfare.

Information Warfare Game Model
Now that a basic idea of game theory and its prior uses have been provided, this
section describes how game theory is implemented within the information warfare game
model. This research will not focus on an all-encompassing overview of game theory or
proofs of its theorems. This has already been provided by a myriad of other authors such
as Gibbons (1997), Aumann and Maschler (1995), and is beyond the scope of this study.
Instead, this section will focus only on those aspects of game theory that apply
specifically to this study's focus and as they pertain to the information warfare model.
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Based on Nash and Bayesian equilibrium, the information warfare game model
developed by Burke (1999) is part of a class of games known as infinitely repeated games
of incomplete information. This type of game lends itself nicely to the study of
information warfare for a number of reasons, which will become evident as the model is
discussed throughout this chapter. At this point, however, the concepts of infinitely
repeated games and incomplete information must be related to the study of IW.
"Infinitely repeated" refers to the fact that neither player knows when the game
will end. Round after round is played with each player either winning or losing, and
gaining his or her respective payoff In this scenario, the player must make his or her
decisions based on the strategy, which will provide the best average payoff over time.
This is similar to information warfare where the defender cannot hope to successfully
protect 100 percent of his information 100 percent of the time. The defender must choose
a strategy, which best protects his or her information over time, dependent upon what
kind of information is most important to the defender.
Repeat play allows a player to change strategies on subsequent moves based on
the information he or she learned from the outcome of the previous move (Carlton and
Perloff, 1999: 175). This is similar to any form of conflict and certainly of information
warfare. As time goes by and actions are taken, a player will form perceptions about his
opponent and his overall goals. As more information is gathered and processed, these
perceptions could be refined and honed causing a change in strategy based on the new
information.
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Incomplete information refers to the fact that each player knows some or all of the
information about himself but not his opponent. In the case of the IW game model, a
player knows his or her own payoff value but not that of his or her opponent. This shows
the asymmetric nature of information warfare in that we often know the defenses as well
as the value of the information we are protecting. However, we rarely know all the
strategies available to our opponent or the value of the information to him, which could
be different than the value to ourselves (Denning: 1999, Schwartau 2000).

Bayesian Nash Equilibrium
The information warfare model relies on what is known as a Bayesian Nash
equilibrium. The calculation for this equilibrium and thus the strategy the player should
choose is shown in a later section. For now, it is enough to know that a Nash equilibrium
exists if; holding all other strategies constant, no player can obtain a higher payoff (profit)
by choosing a different strategy (Gibbons: 1997). This means that for every set of
strategies, there is either a single strategy or a mix of strategies that the player should
choose every time to maximize his or her payoff. This is known as the dominant strategy
as opposed to the other, weaker strategies. The weaker strategies are said to be dominated
by the dominant strategy.
A Bayesian Nash equilibrium is a pair of strategies such that each player's
strategy is a best response to the other player's strategy. However, this is confounded by
the Bayesian equilibrium concept if the player does not know the payoff function of his
opponent. The Bayesian concept says that if a player is operating under incomplete
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information and does not know the payoff function of his or her opponent, then the player
must rely on his or her beliefs about the type of opponent he or she is facing and on his
associated payoff functions (Gibbons: 1997). These beliefs may or may not be true and
have the possibility of changing over time.
The actual equilibrium strategy that a player should employ is based on a
mathematical calculation. The calculation is based on a number of factors, which take
into account concepts such as actual payoff, success probability, and expected payoff. All
of these concepts, along with others, are explained in the next section on game elements.

Game Elements
The information warfare game model consists of four main elements, which
include the players, the payoffs, information, and the strategies available to the players.
Each of these elements was touched on above. This section, however, will seek to
explain each in more detail as they apply to the model
Every game must have a set of players and the IW game model is no exception.
The players represent the decision-makers of the game. In theory, an infinite number of
players could participate in a game (Shubic, 1982: 26); however, most games have a
specific set of players. In the case of the IW model, the set of players equals two and
consists of the attacker and the defender. At each player's disposal there are a number of
resources to draw upon (funds, strategies, manpower, etc.). Normally, the player is also
assumed to be a rational player and will seek to maximize his or her expected payoff.
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However, for the purposes of this study's research objectives, the attacker's rationality
was controlled by the experimenter.
Strategies are courses of action or moves that are available to a player. The IW
game model consists of three strategies available to the attacker. They include attacking
the systems integrity, the systems confidentiality, and the systems availability. The
defender has three strategies as well. They include actions to defend the systems
integrity, the systems confidentiality, and the systems availability. The strategies
themselves are symmetrical to the attacker strategies; however, the actions taken to
implement the strategies can be quite different.
Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944: 79) point out that a strategy is different
from making a decision at every point in the game. A strategy exists when a player
makes a decision beforehand about his or her actions given all possible contingencies.
This does not mean that a player is confined to a single strategy, just that he has
predetermined how his actions will change when given more information.
The normal form of the IW model is depicted by a 4 x 4 matrix of strategies. This
includes the three basic attack and defend strategies as well as an option to not implement
any strategy. Since this option is always present in any information warfare environment,
it must by available to the players even if it is unlikely to be used. The matrix, therefore,
produces 16 possible outcomes depending on the strategy selected by each player.
Based on Nash equilibrium, both the attacker and the defender have an optimum
or dominant strategy (calculation shown later) to choose in order to maximize their
expected payoffs. This can be a pure strategy where the player would choose one strategy
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every time or it could be a mixed strategy where the player picks between two or more
strategies based on a probability distribution. For example, the attacker could choose to
attack the system integrity 35% of the time and attack the system availability 65% of the
time.
A player's payoff refers to the state of affairs after each player has chosen and
implemented a strategy. The value of the payoff is indicated by the intersection of the
strategy matrix (Shubik, 1982: 70). The payoff for each player in the IW game model is
of a monetary nature and it is assumed that it represents all monetary or non-monetary
gains or losses that a player receives for his or her actions. Table 1 shows an example
payoff matrix for an IW game. The top values at each intersection represent the
defender's payoff while the bottom value represents the attacker's payoff. The attacker
values are shaded for clarity. Each value is the actual value a player receives on the
completion of one turn. For the purpose of this study, the values represent millions of
U.S. Dollars.
Table 1. Actual Player Payoff
Defensive Strategies
Integrity
:;Mack:er:;:;:::: Availability
Confidentiality
None

Integrity
-50
70
-35
40
-75
50
0
0

Availability
-50
70
-35
40
-75
50
0
0

Confidentiality
-50
70
-35
40
-75
50
0
0

None
-50
70
-35
40
-75
50
0
0

In keeping with the asymmetrical nature of information warfare, the IW game
model is a non-zero sum game. In other words, one player does not necessarily win the
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exact amount another player looses. For example, an organization (Player A) may have
$50,000 worth of customer information stored in a database that is compromised by a
hacker (Player B). Player B seeks no gain except the satisfaction of compromising the
security. Player B's subsequent satisfaction and prestige may have a value of $500 while
Player A's loss could be in the hundreds of thousands of dollars when news of the breach
leaks and customers no longer trust the organization and go elsewhere.
Information is a key component of the IW game model. As stated earlier this is a
game of incomplete information. Therefore, the player knows information about himself
but only limited information about his opponent. This is the same as saying the player
knows his type but not his opponent's. In a game of incomplete information, a player
must rely on his or her beliefs about the type of player that he or she is opposing. This is
the essence of Bayesian theory (Gibbons: 1997, Aumann and Maschler 1995).
In the r\V game model, a player's type is defined by the value of pursuing a
specific strategy to the player. For example, in the payoff matrix on the previous page,
attacking the integrity of a system is of most value to the attacker, while defending the
confidentiality of the system is of greatest value to the defender. Therefore, the attacker
is of type "Integrity" while the defender is of type "Confidentiality". The importance of
knowing ones type in an information warfare environment cannot be underestimated
because knowing what is really important is key to being able to defend it.
It is important to note that at the beginning of a repeated game each player will
know his or her own type but not the type of his opponent. This is the same as saying the
player knows his own payoff function for a specific strategy but not his opponent's
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(Gibbons, 1997: 136). However, as the game progresses each player will gather more
information about his or her opponent and may deduce his or her type. Additionally, as
shown in the next section, a player's type (e.g. integrity), although influential, does not
automatically equate to being the player's equilibrium strategy.

Determining Expected Payoff
Until now the term payoff has been used rather generically. However, it is
important to note the difference between a player's actual payoff and his expected payoff.
Actual payoff refers to the actual gain or loss experienced by the player after the
completion of one turn in a repeated game. One turn is defined as each player choosing
and implementing a strategy simultaneously. Alternatively, a player's expected payoff in
the IW game model takes into account the probability of a strategy succeeding (success
probability) as well as the player's beliefs about the other player's type. The formulas
used for calculating expected payoff are as follows:

Att. Expected Payoff = Success Probability * Actual Payoff
Def. Expected Payoff = [(Success Probability * Actual Loss) - Actual Loss * (-1)]

The defender's success probability is based on the percentage chance of his chosen
strategy defending against the attacker's chosen strategy. The attacker's success
probability is equal to 1 minus the defense success probability (see Table 2). Again, the
defender's success probability is on top while the attackers is on the bottom.
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Table 2. Success Probability Matrix

Defender
Availability
0.5
0.5
0.6
0.4
0.5
0.5
1
0

Integrity
0.7
0.3
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.5
1
0

Attacker
Integrity
Availability
Confidentiality
None

Confidentiality
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.7
0.3
1
0

None
0.2
0.8
0.2
0.8
0.2
0.8
1
0

Table 3 shows the expected payoff calculations based on the actual payoff and the
success probability for Game II where each player is of type Integrity. The attacker's
values are grayed for clarity. Note: the actual payoff, success probability, and expected
Table 3. Expected Payoff Table
Defender

I

/Stacker

A

C

None

SUooess Actual Bpect Suooess Actual Bpect Suooess Actual Bpect Suooess Actual Bpact
Rob. Ryoff R^dF Rcb. Raycff Rfydf Rob. Rfydf Rfydf Rob
Rfydf Rjycff
I

0.70 -70.00 -21.00

0.75 -70.00 -17.50
17.50

0.20 -70.00

-56.00

0.30 70.00 21.00

0.25

70.00

53.CC

A

0.50 -50.00 -25.00

0.40 -50.00 -30.00

0.60 -50.00 -20.00

0.20 -50.00

-40.00

0.50 40.00 20.00

0.60

0.40

40.00

16.00

0.80

40.00

3200

C

0.50 -25.00 -1250

0.50 -25.00 -1250

0.63 -25.00

-9.25

0.20 -25.00

-20.00

0.50 55.00 27.50

0.50

0.37

0.80

55.00

44.00

1.00

0.00

0.00

1.00

0.00

QOO

0.00

0.00

0.00

1.00
0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

Nxe

70.00

0.55 -70.00 -31.50

40.00 24.00
55.00 27.50
0.00
0.00

0.00
0.00

0.45

1.00
0.00

70.00 31.50

55.00 20.35
0.00
0.00

0.00
0.00

0.80

payoff values used in this experiment for the basic game are the same as those developed
and used by Burke for the sake of consistency and comparability. Later it is shown that
the basic values can be extended to strategies for games in which players are allowed to
select multiple strategies in a single turn. Now that the expected payoffs are known for
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each alternative outcome, it is possible to explain how expected payoffs are used to
determine a player's equilibrium strategy.

Determining Equilibrium Strategy
A player's equilibrium strategy in any game of incomplete information is the
strategy or set of strategies that is a best response to the opponent's strategy (Gibbons,
1997: 137). This, however, takes into account the player's beliefs about the other
player's type. Determining each player's equilibrium is a two step process, which sets a
probability distribution over the set of strategies. It is important to remember that
determining the equilibrium strategy is based on the expected payoff instead of the actual
payoff in order to account for the probability of the attack succeeding..
The first step to determine the equilibrium strategy is to eliminate dominated
strategies from consideration. A dominated strategy is a strategy that is never a best
response to any strategy played by the opponent. Because a dominated strategy has no
chance of being played, it is given a value of zero in the probability distribution. This is
not to say that a player can not choose the strategy but that he or she should not in order
to maximize his or her utility.
Referring back to table 3 for Game II, the attacker's Availability strategy and the
defender's Integrity strategy both have probability of zero because in each case it would
be wiser to choose another strategy. For instance, if the attacker chose an Availability or
Confidentiality strategy the defender loses less money based on expected payoff by using
a Confidentiality strategy. If the attacker chooses an Integrity strategy the defender's best
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option is to choose an Availability strategy in order to lose the least amount if money.
Likewise, it is never good for either player to choose no strategy so it is also given a value
of zero.
The second step to determining the equilibrium strategy is to apply a probability
distribution across the remaining strategies. This is done by solving the four equations
below provided by Burke (1999: 32). In essence, what the equations does is set the sum
probability of each player's remaining strategies equal to one. Then it determines how
often each should be play based on the expected payoff of each strategy to both the
attacker and the defender.

P(Att. I) + P(Att. C) = 1
P(Def. A) + P(Def C) = 1
-17.5 * P(Att. I) - 12.5 * P(Att. C) = -31.5 *P(Att. I) - 9.25 * P(Att. C)
17.5 * P(Def. A) + 31.5 * P(Def. C) = -27.5 *P(Def. A) + 15.125 * P(Def C)
Results:
Attacker: P(I) = 0.18, P(C) = 0.82
Defender: P(A) = 0.63, P(C) = 0.37

The preceding equations provide a mixed strategy profile where the attacker
should choose an Integrity attack 18% of the time and a Confidentiality attack 82% of the
time. The Defender, however, should choose an Availability defense 63% of the time
while choosing a Confidentiality defense 37% of the time in order to maximize the
expected payoff. Notice that even though both the defender and the attacker are of type
Integrity, it is never beneficial for the defender to use integrity as a defense. The repeated
nature of the game should allow a player to come to this realization over time.
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Model Enhancements and Hypotheses
The preceding section described the basic elements of the IW game model,
including the underlying game theoretic concepts. The following four sections describe
enhancements made to the information warfare model. These enhancements fall directly
out of the research questions discussed in Chapter I. They include: allowing a person to
implement more the one strategy at a time, instituting budgetary constraints, controlling
the rationality of the opposing player, and modifying the calculation to measure
equilibrium attainment by the players. This section also states the hypotheses associated
with the enhancements.

Multiple Strategy Selection
Decision-makers are rarely limited to implementing a single strategy. Often
times, lack of complete information about threats can force a decision-maker to
implement multiple strategies to ensure that all of his or her bases are covered. Even if
complete information is known, a combination of strategies may be called for. Cohen
(1999) views this approach as "combining the effectiveness of the different approaches
to different degrees" so that a mix of strategies coexists over time. This can also be
thought of as a layering of defensive strategies. In military terms, this is known as defense
in depth or full dimensional protection (Turk and Hollingsworth: 1999; DOD: 2000).
At first glance, it may seem beneficial to always implement multiple strategies.
This however, may not be the case for all situations. The benefits of selecting multiple
strategies must always be weighed against loses that can occur by spreading resources to
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thinly. In trying to protect everything a player may leave his or her most valuable
resources vulnerable degree that is unacceptable.
For the purposes of the IW game model, a combination of strategies can be
thought of as a strategy in and of itself. In other words, each possible combination of the
available strategies becomes its own strategy providing eight alternatives for the player to
choose from. Previous studies have shown, that the number of alternatives available was
significantly inversely related to the accuracy of decisions made (Malhotra: 1982, Best
and Ursic:1987, Helgeson and Ursic: 1993). It is conceivable, therefore, that allowing a
player to choose multiple strategies at one time will decrease that player's ability to
identify and play the equilibrium strategy.

Hypothesis 1: Multiple strategy selection will decrease a player's ability to
identify and play the equilibrium strategy and thus result in a lower
equilibrium score.

The eight alternatives created by allowing multiple selection turn the original 4 x
4 matrix of strategy payoffs into a 8 x 8 matrix with 64 possible outcomes or strategy
combinations as shown in Table 4. The payoffs for each combination of strategies are
merely an average of the strategies utilized by the attacker. It must be remembered that
the loss a defender realizes is dependent on the value of the information attacked by the
attacker. If an attacker succeeds in a combination of Integrity and Availability attack, the
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defender loses the same amount whether he or she defends against that type of attack or
chooses no strategy whatsoever.
Table 4. Actual Player Payoff for Multi-Strategy Game
Attacker
1
IA
IC
A
AC
C
IAC
None

I
-70.00
70.00
-60.00
55.00
-47.50
62.50
-50.00
40.00
-37.50
47.50
-25.00
55.00
-48.33
55.00
0.00
0.00

IA
-70.00
70.00
-60.00
55.00
47.50
62.50
-50.00
40.00
-37.50
47.50
-25.00
55.00
48.33
55.00
0.00
0.00

IC

Defender
A

AC

C

-70.00
70.00
-60.00
55.00
47.50
62.50
-50.00
40.00
-37.50
47.50
-25.00
55.00
-48.33
55.00
0.00
0.00

-70.00
70.00
-60.00
55.00
-47.50
62.50
-50.00
40.00
-37.50
47.50
-25.00
55.00
48.33
55.00
0.00
0.00

-70.00
70.00
-60.00
55.00
47.50
62.50
-50.00
40.00
-37.50
47.50
-25.00
55.00
48.33
55.00
0.00
0.00

-70.00
70.00
-60.00
55.00
-47.50
62.50
-50.00
40.00
-37.50
47.50
-25.00
55.00
-48.33
55.00
0.00
0.00

IAC
-70.00
70.00
-60.00
55.00
47.50
62.50
-50.00
40.00
-37.50
47.50
-25.00
55.00
48.33
55.00
0.00
0.00

None
-70.00
70.00
-60.00
55.00
47.50
62.50
-50.00
40.00
-37.50
47.50
-25.00
55.00
48.33
55.00
0.00
0.00

Allowing a player to implement multiple strategies must also take into account the
probability of success for using more than one strategy. The success probability of using
two strategies is not necessarily the sum of the success probabilities of the individual
strategies. As pointed out by Denning (1999: 37), strategies in information warfare are
not "mutually exclusive" and many of the tools used fall into more than one category.
This, however, does not mean that benefits to using more than one defensive strategy are
non-existent. Indeed, many of the tools used could have a synergetic effect.
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Table 5. Success Probability Matrix for Multi-Strategy Game

Attacker
1
IA
IC
A
AC
C
IAC
None

1
0.70
0.30
0.50
0.50
0.50
0.50
0.50
0.50
0.40
0.60
0.50
0.50
0.37
0.63
1.00
0.00

IA
0.83
0.18
0.61
0.39
0.61
0.39
0.55
0.45
0.48
0.53
0.60
0.40
0.46
0.54
1.00
0.00

IC
0.73
0.28
0.59
0.41
0.60
0.41
0.65
0.35
0.56
0.44
0.67
0.34
0.48
0.52
1.00
0.00

Defender
A
0.75
0.25
0.48
0.53
0.53
0.48
0.40
0.60
0.35
0.65
0.50
0.50
0.35
0.65
1.00
0.00

AC
0.75
0.25
0.58
0.43
0.61
0.39
0.60
0.40
0.53
0.47
0.67
0.34
0.47
0.53
1.00
0.00

C
0.55
0.45
0.48
0.53
0.49
0.51
0.60
0.40
0.52
0.49
0.63
0.37
0.39
0.61
1.00
0.00

IAC
0.87
0.13
0.58
0.42
0.61
0.40
0.70
0.30
0.52
0.48
0.74
0.26
0.57
0.43
1.00
0.00

None
0.20
0.80
0.10
0.90
0.10
0.90
0.20
0.80
0.10
0.90
0.20
0.80
0.10
0.90
1.00
0.00

To account for synergistic effects of multiple strategies, when calculating the
defender's success probability, the IW game model takes the average of the success
probabilities for the chosen strategies and adds 10 percent for each additional strategy
chosen above the number chosen by the attacker. Since the attacker's success probability
is dependent on the defender, there is no change in the attacker's success probability
formula. The success probability for the attacker remains one minus the success
probability of the defender. The success probabilities for the multiple strategy selection
version of Game II are shown in Table 5. It is important to note that combining strategies
does not always insure a higher probability of success against any given attack.
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Budgetary Constraints
Often times a decision-maker must take into account the monetary cost of
differing strategies. Denning (1999: 37) points out that it is not always "cost effective or even possible - to provide sufficient defenses to prevent all offensive operations and
avoid all losses". A decision-maker, therefore, must decide where it is best to invest his
or her limited resources.
Budget constraints have the potential to affect a decision-maker's choice, whether
or not he or she has sufficient funds to cover all possibilities. For example, "you get what
you pay for" is a term that is often associated with the linking of quality with price. It is
feasible that a decision-maker could believe that a higher priced strategy will equate to a
better defense or that a lower priced strategy will save the company money. Though this
is possible, it is not necessarily the case. Either case could lead to a loss of value in the
form of the value of stolen information or monetary costs.
Monetary constraints were operationalized in the IW model by providing the
player with a monthly budget to be used on the purchase of IW strategies. Each strategy
had a monetary cost associated with it, which was subtracted from the player's budget
each time it was selected. For games in which multiple strategies could be selected on
each turn, the cost was equal to the sum of the individual strategies. Though the player
was working on a limited budget, care was taken to ensure that he or she had a sufficient
amount to play the equilibrium strategy (i.e., Availability 63%, Confidentiality 37%).
However, it is hypothesized that working on a budget will reduce a player's equilibrium
attainment.
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Hypothesis 2: Budgetary constraints will decrease a player's ability to
identify and play the equilibrium strategy and thus result in a lower
equilibrium score.

Opponent Rationality
Game theory generally assumes that all players will act rationally (Gibbons,
Harsanyi, et al). That is to say that a player will always make decisions on the basis of
maximizing his or her utility. Myerson (1992: 66) points out, however, that according to
experimental evidence "axioms of consistency in decision making", which are the basis
of rational utility maximization, are often violated in real life. In other words, this is not a
perfect world and people do not always make decisions that maximize their utility.
The possibility of a player making decisions that are not of a rational nature poses
an interesting question. How does facing an irrational or seemingly irrational opponent in
the IW game model affect a player's ability to identify and play the equilibrium strategy?
This situation can come up in one of two ways. Either the player's opponent is not of,
what most people would call, a rational mind or the opponent's utility (or perceived
utility) is so different from the player's that what is rational for the opponent is seemingly
irrational to the player.

Hypothesis 3: Facing a seemingly irrational opponent will decrease a player's
ability to identify and play the equilibrium strategy and thus result in a
lower equilibrium score.

29

Information warfare is not devoid of these types of situations. Unlike traditional
warfare, IW has the ability to totally mask the identity of the attacker and thus hamper the
defender's ability to determine his or her overall objectives. Cronin contends that this
"near unknowability of the attackers coupled with the nagging uncertainty as to his
driving motivations" is one of the most critical aspects of information warfare (1999:
259). This view is seemingly supported by the former Commander of U.S. Space
Command and current Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Richard
Myers. According to General Myers, one of the biggest problems facing the military
when confronted with a cyber attack is determining the nature of the attacker. "Is it a
nation-state? Is it a terrorist? Is it a hacker or someone out for a joyride on the Internet?"
(Boyle, 2000) A rational decision for any one of these players may well be irrational for
another as well as for the defender.
This study sought to account for the possibility of facing a seemingly irrational
opponent by controlling his or her rationality. Unlike the original IW game model study,
the subjects in this study played the computer, which acted as the opponent, instead of
another subject. Half of the treatment groups played a rational opponent who played only
equilibrium strategies based on their equilibrium percentage (i.e., Integrity attack 18% of
the time and a Confidentiality attack 82%) while the other half played a seemingly
irrational opponent who chose between all alternative strategies randomly.
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Equilibrium Calculations
As pointed out by Burke (1999: 67), his original study was limited by the method
used to calculate equilibrium play. This is because using the number of rounds to reach
equilibrium (NORRE) calculation to measure equilibrium attainment among players has
two inherent weaknesses. Those weaknesses along with a proposed solution is the focus
of this section.
First, NORRE does not account for players who attain equilibrium play early on in
the game but happen to play a non-equilibrium strategy late in the game in an attempt to
throw off their opponent. For example, a player could realize the equilibrium strategy at
Round 5 and play it until Round 35. At that point, he could decide to play a nonequilibrium strategy for a round or two in order to try to confuse his opponent. The
formula would then determine that the player attained equilibrium at Round 35 instead of
Round 5.
The second problem with the NORRE calculation is that the calculation does not
account for differing levels of equilibrium strategies. For example, the equilibrium
strategy may be to play strategy "A" 83 percent of the time and strategy "B" 17 percent of
the time. The previous calculation only examines at which point the player stops playing
anything but the equilibrium strategy. It does not take into consideration if the player
played strategy "A" 40 percent of the time and strategy "B" 60 percent of the time.
This study proposes to calculate the equilibrium attainment measure by using a
percentage instead of the raw number of rounds needed to reach equilibrium. In other
words, equilibrium attainment will be measured as a percentage of total rounds played.
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This can be calculated at any round of play or as a total for the entire game. The
independent variables, therefore, can be measured by how close a player came to the ideal
equilibrium percentages (e.g. strategy "A" 83%, Strategy "B" 17%). This change in
calculation should create a more robust IW game model.

Hypothesis 4: Measuring equilibrium as a percentage of total rounds played
(Percent Equilibrium Attainment) will result in a higher mean equilibrium
score than calculating the number of rounds to reach equilibrium (NORRE).

Summary
This chapter sought to provide insight into the information warfare game model
and the enhancements, which are the focus of this study. It provided a general overview
of current strategies in IW as well as those used in the study. The chapter also provided
an overview of game theory as it applies to the study. Finally, this chapter provided an
explanation of the model enhancements as well as the stated hypotheses. The next
chapter will explain the methodology used to test the stated hypotheses.
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III. Methodology

Introduction
The preceding chapter explained the basic strategies within information warfare,
described the information warfare game model, and provided model enhancements based
on the stated research questions in Chapter I. This chapter will seek to explain the
methodology used to test the hypotheses that were developed in Chapter II. It will do this
by first describing the basic research design for the experiment. It will then show how
and why subjects were selected for the experiment and placed in their treatment groups.
Then the basic conduct of the experiment will be shown followed by a description of the
experimental game software used. Finally, this chapter will end by presenting the
statistical analysis that will be used to test the hypotheses in Chapter IV.

Research Design
As stated in Chapter I, this research was conducted using a within-subjects and
between-subjects analysis of variance research design. The experiment consisted of a
pretest-posttest control group design (true experiment) as defined by Dooley (1999) and
included 8 treatment groups to form a complete 2x2x2 factorial experiment. The
research design is depicted in figure 1 on the following page.
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0 XiO

Group 1

0 X20

Group 2

0 X30

Group 3

0 X40

Group 4

0 X50

Group 5

0 X60

Group 6

0 X70

Group 7

0 X80

Group 8

Figure 1. Research Design
The experiment involved two rounds of game play for each group. In the first
round (pretest), all groups played without a budget, were limited to just one strategy per
turn, and faced a rational opponent. This constitutes the baseline and is identical to
treatment one in the posttest. The second round of play (posttest) consisted of each
subject playing the game based on one of the eight treatments. The eight treatments are
as follows with the control group being treatment number one.

Treatment 1: No Budget

Single Strategies

Rational Opponent

Treatment 2: No Budget

Single Strategies

Irrational Opponent

Treatment 3: No Budget

Multiple Strategies

Rational Opponent

Treatment 4: No Budget

Multiple Strategies

Irrational Opponent

Treatment 5: Budget

Single Strategies

Rational Opponent

Treatment 6: Budget

Single Strategies

Irrational Opponent
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Treatment 7: Budget

Multiple Strategies

Rational Opponent

Treatment 8: Budget

Multiple Strategies

Irrational Opponent

Figure 2 provides a graphical depiction of the full model. The dependent variable
in this experiment is the percentage of equilibrium attainment for a single player during a
single game. The independent variables are whether a player has budgetary constraints,
whether the player is allowed to play more than one strategy simultaneously, and whether
the player is facing a rational opponent or an irrational opponent.

Percent
Equilibrium
Attainment

Figure 2. Effects of Independent Variables on Equilibrium Attainment
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Subject Selection and Assignment
The population of interest for this experiment consisted of those individuals who
currently are or that are likely in the future to make decisions regarding defensive
information warfare policies. The sampling frame consisted of graduate students
attending the Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT). Results from the sampling frame
can be generalized to the larger population due to two reasons. First, all the graduate
students are professional military officers who have been in the field where they likely
had to make similar decisions of utility maximization in the past. Second, graduate
students at AFIT will return to operational and staff units where they will be expected to
make or recommend such decisions.
The experiment was conducted During November and December of 2000. The
sample size consisted of 80 volunteers from the sampling frame, playing two games each.
The sampling size, which allowed for 10 people per treatment group, was based on
recommendations for the design of controlled experiments by McClave, Benson, and
Sincich (1998). The sampling size also allowed the experiment to achieve its desired
power level of greater than 0.80.
Subjects were randomly assigned a subject number using the random numbers
generator in Microsoft Excel. The subject number generated subsequently determined the
treatment group in which the subject was placed. During each round of play, which is
described in the next section, the subjects were assigned a role as a defender. The
attacker in each round was played by the computer, allowing the experimenter to control
the attacker's rationality.
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The Experiment
The experiment consisted of two separate games being played. The first game
(pretest) took place in early November 2000 and consisted of each subject playing the IW
game with the same treatment (Treatment 1, control group treatment). The experiment
was administered by e-mailing a link to the Information Warfare Game, which resided on
a network drive at AFIT, to each of the subjects. The subjects were given simple
instructions in the e-mail to click on the link and play the game.
To ensure uniformity among all players, the computer provided all game play
instructions. To ensure that the subjects actually read and understood the instructions,
each subject was given a short quiz before the start of play. A copy of the instructions
provided to the players, the quiz and screen shots from the game can by found in
appendixes A - E. Once a player reached the end of game play, the program thanked the
subject for his or her efforts and automatically terminated.
The second game (post test) occurred approximately three weeks after the first
round. This combined with the simplicity of the game should have been sufficient time to
account for learning effects. The second round of game play was administered identical
to the first. However, in this round each group played with the factors associated with
their treatment groups. The control group (Treatment Group 1) played with the same
factors as round one.
Both rounds consisted of playing a mixed strategy game. However, a different
game was played in each round in an additional control for learning effects. Round one
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consisted of game II where both the attacker and the defender were of type Integrity. This
equated to the equilibrium strategy for the attacker consisting of 18% Integrity and 82%
Confidentiality. The defender's equilibrium strategy consisted of playing Availability
63% of the time and Confidentiality 37% of the time.
In round two, the subjects played game CI where the attacker was of type Integrity
and the defender was of type Confidentiality. The equilibrium strategies for the attacker
and defender varied depending on whether they could select multiple strategies or not.
For single strategy selection games, the attacker's equilibrium strategy consisted of
playing Integrity 58% of the time and Availability 42% of the time. The defender's
equilibrium strategy included playing Integrity 86% of the time and Availability 14% of
the time. In the multiple strategy games, the attacker's equilibrium strategy consisted of
playing Integrity 19% of the time while playing a combination of Integrity, Availability,
and Confidentiality 81% of the time. The defender should have played Integrity 52% of
the time while playing a combination of Integrity, Availability, and Confidentiality 47%
of the time.

The Game
The information warfare game software used for this experiment was the same
created and used by Burke (1999) but re-coded with the enhancements discussed in
Chapters I and II. The game is based on Microsoft ACCESS and Visual Basic code.
Each player, both the attacker (computer automated) and the defender (the subject), had
three information warfare strategies to choose from with the option of playing zero to all
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of them on each repetition. This, however, was limited by the amount of funds available
or by the treatment assigned. A player knew if his or her strategy was successful by the
payoff or loss that he or she received in monetary form at the end of each repetition (each
player selecting a strategy).
The defenders were not told that they were playing a computer opponent.
However, because of the nature of the game it is assumed that the subjects came to this
realization. In any case, it should not have made a difference in game play. This is
because a player's equilibrium strategy is always the best response to any strategy chosen
by the computer. The player therefore should have still been able to determine the best
strategy to play.
The goal of the player was to find the strategy or mix of strategies, which
maximizes his or her payoff over the long run. This is consistent with the instructions
that the player received by a pre written script on the computer. The only instructions
given by the experimenter were to click on the game link and play the game. Each game
consisted of fifty repetitions of each player (attacker and defender) choosing a strategy or
strategies to play and then viewing his payoff or loss.
The game software recorded each move made by both the attacker and defender
for every game. In addition, it recorded the amount of dollars spent on differing strategies
at each round. It can be expected that at first a player's strategy or strategies will vary
considerably. However, as each payoff or loss is observed, the player should be able to
calculate the equilibrium strategy or combination of strategies, which provides the
maximum gain over time. This of course works off the assumption that the subject will
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actually seek to maximize his or her payoff as they were told to do in the instructions.
Since all of the subjects are graduate students at the Air Force Institute of Technology and
are considered to have a high degree of professionalism and integrity, it is assumed that
this will be the case.

Statistical Analysis
This study used three different methods to analyze the data and test the
hypotheses. The overall difference in treatments was tested by using a one-way ANOVA
and students t-test, while a regression analysis was used to gain a greater understanding of
the differences in treatment factors and to test Hypothesis 1, Hypothesis 2, and
Hypothesis 3. These tests were conducted using the results (PEA) from round two, which
included all the treatment groups. Finally, a paired t-test was used to test Hypothesis 4
using the results from round one. Furthermore, the percent equilibrium attainment (PEA)
was used as the primary means of measure in all tests.

Summary
This chapter outlined the basic research design of the study. It also provided a
description of the IW Game and how it was used to gather the data necessary for the
testing of the hypotheses. Finally, this chapter provided a brief preview of the various
statistical methods that were used to test the hypotheses.
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IV. Results and Analysis

Introduction
Chapter III depicted the methodology used to conduct the experiment and collect
data to test the hypotheses for this study. This chapter is presented in two sections. First
it will describe the statistical analysis used to test the hypotheses. Secondly it will report
the results of the analysis.

Description of Statistical Analysis
Hypotheses 1 through 3 were tested by conducting an analysis of variance based
on the mean percent equilibrium attainment scores. Since the only controlled
independent variables in the experiment are whether there are budgetary constraints,
whether multi-strategy selection is possible, and whether the opponent is rational or
irrational, this is a so-called three-factor experiment (McClave, Benson, Sincich, 1999).
The full factorial design produces eight factor-level combinations (treatments). The
dependant variable was the subject's percentage of equilibrium attainment and ranged
between 0.0 and 1.0 for a single game. The experimental unit (EU) for this experiment is
one individual playing one game. The observational unit (OU) is also one individual
playing one game.
The analysis of variance was carried out by using two separate methods of
analysis. Each method was conducted utilizing a significance level of a = 0.05. Alpha
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represents the chance of committing a Type I error or incorrectly rejecting the null
hypothesis (H0 = status quo). In other words, there is a five percent chance of
accidentally accepting the alternative hypothesis (Ha = research hypothesis) when in fact
there is no significant difference in the treatment groups. All tests were also based on the
assumptions of independence, constant variance, and normality.
The experiment also had to take into account the chance of producing a Type II
error, which is defined as the probability of concluding that the null hypothesis is true
when it is in fact false. The probability of committing a Type II error is equal to ß. The
power of the experiment, which is defined as the probability of the test correctly leading
to the rejection of the null hypothesis for a particular value of |a in the alternative
hypothesis is equal to 1 - ß. Therefore, any increase in the power of the test leads to an
equal decrease in ß, or the probability of committing a Type II error. For this experiment,
power was calculated to be 0.80 as determined by a combination of effect size, standard
deviation of error (sigma), the significance level (alpha), and sample size (Sail and
Lehman, 1996: 163).
The first method consisted of a one-way analysis of variance using the Student's t.
This test compares the means of each treatment group to determine if there is a significant
statistical difference in their value. This is done by fitting the Y variable (Percent
Equilibrium Attainment) to the X variable (Treatment Group). The Y variable is
continuous and can take on a value between 0.0 and 1.0. The X variable is categorical
and can take on a value of Treatment 1 through Treatment 8. The ratio of variation
between each treatment group was measured by using the F-statistic. The F-statistic was
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considered significant (i.e. that there was a significant statistical difference between the
treatment groups) at an a < 0.05.
The second method of analysis consisted of generating a multiple linear
regression model using the least squares approach. This was conducted to determine the
significant of each of the independent variables (budget, multiple strategies, opponent
Rationality) in relation to the dependent variable (Percent Equilibrium Attainment). Each
of the independent variables were coded as either 1 or 0, which represents their two
possible states of existence. A rejection of the null hypothesis (indicating an effect on the
dependent variable) should generate negative coefficients for the independent variables.
In other words, the presence of any of the above independent variables should cause a
lower percentage of equilibrium attainment on the part of the subject.
In addition to the above dependant variables that are of interest to this study, the
regression model will include pre-test (Game 1) equilibrium scores and information
warfare (IW) experience as covariates. This is in keeping with the original IW Game
study conducted by Burke (1999). The original study attempted to use a pure strategy
game average score to account for a player's innate game theoretic rationality in a mixed
strategy game. This study will attempt to account for innate ability by using the pre-test
equilibrium scores as a covariate in the regression analysis. The IW experience covariate
accounts for a player's prior experience in information warfare and should produce a
positive coefficient.
The overall significance of the model in each analysis method was assessed using
R2 as the multiple coefficient of determination. R2 measures how well the model fits the
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data, and therefore, provides a measure of the overall usefulness of the model.
Additionally, R2 measures the explanatory power of all the terms included in the model
assuming that all of the terms are present. The closer R2 comes to 1.0 the more
explanatory power of the model.
Hypothesis 4 was tested by conducting a paired t-test on the equilibrium results
from game 1. The paired t-test tests to see if the means of two variables are the same at a
0.05 significance level. For this test, the variables consisted of the Percent Equilibrium
Attainment score (described earlier) and the NORRE score (as developed by Burke) for
the first game. However, in order for the two measures to be directly comparable, the
NORRE score had to be converted into a percentage. This was done by using the
equation (50 - NORRE)/50 where 50 equals the total rounds in the game.

Analysis Results
One-way ANOVA - Student 's-t
Figure 3 on the following page provides a graphical representation of the Y
response variable (percent equilibrium attainment) plotted against the treatment groups
for round two. The graphic clearly shows a decreasing trend in equilibrium attainment as
the different constraints are added. Treatment Group 1, which acted as the control group
had a mean equilibrium attainment of 67 percent while Treatment Group 8 had a mean
equilibrium attainment of only 38 percent. The means for all treatment groups along with
the standard error calculated in the analysis of variance can be found in Table 6. Note, a
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one-way ANOVA was also conducted using round one (Pre-Test) results and found no
statistical difference between the treatment groups.
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Figure 3. Equilibrium Attainment vs Treatment Group

The one way analysis of variance and students t-test show that there is a
significant difference between the mean equilibrium attainment of Treatment Group 1
(the control group) with that of Treatment Groups 3,4,5,6,7, and 8) at a < 0.05. This
seems to suggest that budget constraints and / or multiple strategy selection significantly
affect a player's ability to identify and play the equilibrium strategy. There was, however,
no significant difference between Treatment Groups 1 and 2. This suggests that an
opponent's rationality had no effect on a player's ability to find and play the equilibrium
strategy. To find out exactly how and to what degree budgetary constraints and multiple
selection effect equilibrium attainment, a regression analysis had to be performed.
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Table 6. Equilibrium Attainment Means per Treatment Group

Level

Mean

Std. Error

Treatment 1
Treatment 2
Treatment 3
Treatment 4
Treatment 5
Treatment 6
Treatment 7
Treatment 8
Standard Error uses a pooled estimate of
error variance

0.670
0.562
0.436
0.476
0.478
0.456
0.398
0.384

0.6311
0.6311
0.6311
0.6311
0.6311
0.6311
0.6311
0.6311

Multiple Regression Analysis
This section presents the results of the regression analysis and serves as the
primary basis for support or rejection of the Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3. The full model
includes both the IW experience and game one equilibrium attainment covariates along
with the three primary treatment factors and their interactions. The 23 percent of the
variation in equilibrium attainment accounted for by the model should be sufficient for
assessing the stated hypotheses. The beta coefficient for each variant along with its
associated significance level is presented in Table 7 on the following page.
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Table 7. Regression Analysis
Beta
Coefficient
0.078
-0.260
-0.133
-0.220
-0.251
0.143
0.168
0.162
-0.179

Independent Variables
IW Experience.
Percent Equilibrium Attainment (PEA) 1
Rationality
Budget
Multiple
Rational * Budget
Rational * Multiple
Budget * Multiple
Rationality * Budget * Multiple

Significance
Level
0.149
0.083
0.134
0.017
0.005
0.259
0.180
0.194
0.310

Though not a primary focus of this study, the significance of the two covariates
will be discussed first. A review of the regression results shows that prior experience with
information warfare did not have a significant impact on equilibrium attainment at a <
0.05. This differs from the results reported by Burke (1999) who did find a significant
increase in equilibrium attainment due to prior information warfare experience. The data
does show moderate support for the second covariate, which sought to account for innate
game theoretic ability of the players.
A cursory look at the regression table shows that all three treatment factors
(Rationality, Budget, Multiple) had negative effects on the attainment of equilibrium.
This is evident by the negative signs of their beta coefficients. Budgetary constraints and
multiple strategy selection both had particularly strong effects with significance values
less than 0.05. Therefore, the evidence supports rejecting the null hypotheses for both
Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2 at a < 0.05. However, there is only weak support that
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opponent rationality had any effect on equilibrium attainment. Therefore, the null
hypothesis for Hypothesis 3 cannot be rejected at a < 0.05. Interactions between the
treatment factors were also tested but none showed significance.

Paired t-Test
Hypothesis 4 was tested using a Paired t-Test to determine if there was a
significant difference in the mean level of equilibrium attainment dependent on the type
of calculation used. The results of the test, along with a graphical representation are
depicted in Figure 4. Specifically the results show that the null hypothesis (i.e., that there
is no significant difference in the means) can be rejected at a < 0.05.
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The bold line on top shows the points where the two variables are equal. The set
of thin lines below show the 95 percent confidence interval of the mean difference. If the
bold line was inside of the confidence interval, it would indicate that there was no
difference in the means. However, in light of the apparent mean difference of 0.34, the
null hypothesis is rejected and Hypothesis 4 is supported.

Summary
This chapter described the statistical analysis used to test the hypotheses. It the
reported the results of the analysis conducted on the experimental data. The analysis
found strong support for Hypotheses 1, 2, and 4 but could only find weak support for
Hypothesis 3. The implications for these results will be explored in the next chapter.
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V. Discussion

Introduction
The last chapter reported the results of this study's experiment as they related to
the stated hypotheses. This section will look at the implications of those results in further
detail. Additionally, some of the limitations of this study and recommendations for future
research are discussed. Finally, concluding remarks are given to close out the study.

Hypothesis 1 - Multiple Strategy Selection
The results reported in Chapter IV show strong support for Hypothesis 1. That is,
the ability of a player to choose multiple strategies at once tended to have a negative
effect on a player's ability to find and play the equilibrium strategy (see Figure 5). This is
consistent with the work of Malhotra (1982), Best and Ursic (1987), and Helgeson and
Ursic (1993), who all found that the number of alternatives available had a negative effect
on the accuracy of decision-making. This inability to make accurate decisions when
faced with a growing number of alternatives could have an impact on the effectiveness of
strategies chosen by IT professionals seeking to protect our nation's critical information
systems.
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Figure 5. Multiple Strategies vs. PEA Game 2

Support for Hypothesis 1 indicates that a decision maker's effort of trying to
protect everything may have the reverse effect of not protecting anything to the desired
degree. This suggests that it may be best to determine what type of information is most
important and to concentrate our defensive strategies on it. Of course, this will be
dependent upon the specific system being protected and shows that a cookie cutter
strategy of protecting everything regardless of "type" will not work. For example, if a
system has top secret information on it that could cause grave and serious harm to the
national security of the United States, then it may by better to concentrate on the
confidentiality of the system instead of its availability. Trying to ensure that the system is
available 100 percent of the time and easily accessible to its users could compromise the
confidentiality of the system and subsequently cost American lives.

51

Hypothesis 2 - Budgetary Constraints
The results also found strong support for Hypothesis 2, that budgetary constraints
placed on a player had a negative effect on his or her ability to find and play the
equilibrium strategy (see Figure 6). It is important to remind the reader that each player
had more than sufficient funds to consistently play the equilibrium strategy. Interestingly,
it was most often best for the player to choose the least expensive strategy available to
him or her. This provides some interesting insight into how differing strategies are
judged based on price.
0.75
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w

0.50

z<
0.25 -

0.00

Figure 6. Budgetary Constraints vs. PEA Game 2

Consistently throughout the course of play, subjects who had to purchase
strategies tended to choose more expensive strategies than were needed. This suggests
that players believed that the more expensive strategies were somehow better than the less
expensive strategies. However, this assumption on the part of the players had no basis in
fact. Repeated losses should have helped the player to eventually come to this
realization; however, it may have taken more time than the 50 turns allotted.
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Throughout the Department of Defense and other agencies of the federal
government, strategies are almost never considered without some emphasis on their cost.
The results of this study show that the human mind may tend to automatically equate
more expensive with more effective. That is, if the most expensive strategy is chosen, the
most effective results will be obtained. However, this is not always the case, and the
study's results suggest that when evaluating differing strategies, information technology
professionals may want to first look at the merits of each strategy without regard to cost.
Nothing here suggests that cost should not be considered, only that measures of
effectiveness must be looked at first. This way, a strategy may be chosen which best
protects our systems within the budgetary constraints imposed.

Hypothesis 3 - Opponent Rationality
The data collected for this study does not support the hypothesis that opponent
rationality has a significant effect on a person's ability to find and play the equilibrium
strategy at a < 0.05. However, as depicted in Figure 7, the rationality of an opponent

o.o

Figure 7. Opponent Rationality vs. PEA Game 2
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does have a slightly negative effect if a player is facing someone that is making seemingly
irrational decisions at a < 0.15. Although this study found no significant effect at the
desired a < 0.05, the outcome does provide some impetus for further research in the area.
If further studies also find no significant effect, it could mean that the human
mind does not generally have a problem devising rational solutions in response to
irrational behavior. Taken another way, it is possible for us to develop logical defenses
for our information systems even though we do not know who is attacking them or for
what purpose. We do not need to develop an irrational response by hampering the free
flow of unclassified information or completely tightening the security to our systems to a
point that it denies access to legitimate users. This would be consistent with our
experience in dealing with international and domestic terrorism, which provides a good
example for this scenario.
Most people would associate fundamentalist terrorism with irrational behavior.
This is because the perpetrators generally have little regard for human life including their
own. Additionally, those trying to defend against it, never really know when or why the
perpetrators will strike next. Therefore, even if the terrorist' s actions seem and are
rational to them, to us they seem irrational. Nevertheless, the U.S. manages to devise
rational methods to defend against terrorism using sound practices of security and law
enforcement.
Unfortunately, our defenses are not always 100 percent effective, but in the long
run we maximize payoffs to society by ensuring the relative safety of our citizens while
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maintaining an open society. This is in contrast to an irrational response such as
declaring a police state and indefinitely suspending individual rights in order to
completely eradicate the threat. The irrational response may have short run benefits in the
fight against terrorism but in the long run it would be devastating to our way of life and
the fundamentals of democracy.

Hypothesis 4 - Equilibrium Calculations
Hypothesis 4 looked at the calculation used as the main instrument of measure in
the information warfare model. Specifically, it asked whether calculating equilibrium
attainment as a percentage of total rounds played (PEA) accounts for more equilibrium
attainment (by a player) then counting the number of rounds to reach equilibrium
(NORRE) as performed in the original study by Burke (1999). The analysis found strong
support for this hypothesis, concluding that a mean difference of 0.34 exists between the
equilibrium accounted for using the PEA than the NORRE. Therefore, it is
recommended that any future study use the PEA method of calculation. This allows the
experimenter to calculate exactly how close a subject came to the playing the equilibrium
strategy even in a mixed strategy game.

Study Limitations
Throughout the course of this study, a few limitations became apparent. The first
limitation comes in the assumption that there are only two players (attacker and defender)
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in any given game. The second limitation is based in the way monetary constraints were
integrated into the game. The third limitation is inherent to game theory itself.
In regards to the first limitation, the assumption of only two players probably is
not always the case in real life. Specifically, for any given defender in information
warfare, there could be multiple attackers using different methods. Furthermore, each of
these attackers could have differing objectives, which could affect their utility
maximization. For instance, the United States military information systems face threats
from a myriad of vastly different types of attackers at any point in time. Telling the
difference between the types and reacting appropriately is a significant obstacle. One
type of attacker may be a foreign espionage agency trying to steal secrets. Another
attacker at the same point in time could be a teenage hacker that just wants to overcome a
challenge. Not knowing which type of attacker it is may hamper the development of an
appropriate response.
As for the second limitation, it became apparent that the players might have
disassociated to a degree the purchasing of strategies and the loss of information during
an attack. This is probably because the payoff a defender received (lost) when a
defensive strategy failed was dependent entirely on the strategy chosen by the attacker.
Even though the defender spent money out of the IW budget on purchasing defensive
strategies, he or she did not see it translate directly into the payoff.
The third limitation of this study involves the assumption of a Nash equilibrium in
information warfare. Remember, that an equilibrium strategy is one that the player should
use every time in order to maximize his or her payoffs. Though this was the case for the
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payoffs in this study, it may not be the case in all situations involving information
warfare.
Recommendations for Further Research
Recommendations for further research stem directly from the limitations
discussed previously. Specifically, any future research should include a closer integration
of strategy cost with the actual payoff received by a player. In other words, any payoff
received by the player should be reduced by the cost of the chosen strategy. This could
also be done prior to the calculation of expected payoff so that it is linked to the
equilibrium strategy as well.
A future study could also integrate multiple players into the IW game model.
Although most game theoretic models use only two players, theoretically a game model
could have an infinite amount of players. Zagare (1984: 64) points out, however, that
games of this type are both "quantitatively and qualitatively different from two person
games". He points specifically to the fact that once more than two players are involved in
a game, the possibility of a coalition arises. This possibility also seems to be evident in
information warfare where, for example, an international criminal organization could find
common ground with a rogue nation opposed to the United States.

Conclusion
This study has provided significant enhancements to the information warfare
game model to more accurately represent the realities of information warfare. In addition,
it has provided further confirmation that the model is a useful method of analyzing human
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behavior and the decisions of those engaged in strategy formulation for information
warfare. It has shown that both, the ability to choose multiple strategies and the existence
of budgetary constraints have a significant negative effect on a person's ability to make
accurate decisions about information warfare strategies. It has also provided hope that we
can develop rational responses to what looks like irrational attacks against our systems.
Finally, it has provided a more robust method of measuring a subject's attainment of
equilibrium thus allowing for more accurate results in the analysis of the data.
There is still much work to be done in this field and in the development of the IW
model. It is hoped that others will carry on this work and develop more enhancements to
the model which will further our understanding of information warfare and human nature
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Appendix A: Experiment Instructions

Instructions
Thank you for participating in this experiment. This experiment involves playing a simple Information
Warfare (IW) based game. Please do not use writing materials, calculators, or other external devices while
playing the game. Also, please do not have any other software applications open on your computer during
the experiment. Please do not speak to other subjects during or after the experiment (in particular, do not
reveal your strategies or winnings/losses). Finally, please read all instructions, scenario, and the help page
completely. After you have read all the pages you will be asked to answer a few simple questions to ensure
your comprehension of the experiment. Thank you for your cooperation.

If you encounter a software error that stops you from proceeding during the experiment, please close
the software and notify the experimenter at steven.tait(5),afit.af.mil .

Likewise, if you have any

questions please notify the experimenter.

The purpose of this experiment is to test and validate a game theory model with various aspects of
information warfare. Game theory is a technique frequently used in economics and other social sciences to
model social behavior. The primary motivation for developing a game theory model is to simplify complex
situations. The simplified model can then allow better understanding of people's actions and the reason(s)
for their actions.

Your goal is to maximize your payoff while minimizing your losses - REGARDLES OF WHAT
PREVIOUS IW EXPERIENCE MAY INDICATE.

Each of you will have three strategies available.

These strategies will be explained on the following

Scenario Page. Your overall goal is to determine and employ the combination of strategies that yields you
the best long-term payoff. Under some conditions, it may be advantageous to use a combination of two or
all three strategies in response to your opponent' s strategies. At other times, it may be better to use only
one strategy. During the first few turns you should complete the following actions:
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1)

Determine your best strategy(s), i.e. those that seem to succeed most often and that yield the best longterm payoff.

2)

If no single strategy seems best, determine the combination of strategies that yields higher long-term
payoffs.

3) Attempt to determine the preferred strategy(s) of your opponent and alter your strategy accordingly.
4)

When you believe you have found the best strategy or combination of strategies, continue using it
unless your overall payoffs seriously decline.
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Appendix B: Basic Scenario

Scenario
You are the Chief Information Officer (CIO) for the United States Air Force. From your latest
meeting with senior intelligence advisors and the FBI, you learned that Air Force information
systems are being targeted by a foreign adversary. Their goal is to use information operations to
counter the military advantage held by the United States.
You have since learned that there are three potential strategies available to your adversary. The
opposing states will either try to attack the integrity of Air Force information systems, to affect
the availability of Air Force information systems or they will try to attack the confidentiality of
Air Force information systems. Each of these are strategies and the operations to achieve them
are explained below. Each month your adversary will devote all of its resources to one or none
of these strategies.
1.

Integrity Attack: The goal of this strategy is often to affect the operations of the system
without the knowledge of the user. This strategy involves operations that penetrate the
information systems, tamper with the systems, and fabricate data within the systems.

2.

Availability Attack: This type of attack is commonly known as a denial of service attack. It
differs from an integrity attack in that it overtly halts operations instead of controlling the
output of operations. It takes the form of three types of operations: physical theft of hardware,
sabotage either physically or logically, and censorship.

3.

Confidentiality Attack: The goal of a confidentiality attack is to gather sensitive
information. Five different types of operations attain this outcome: espionage and intelligence
operations, information piracy, penetration into physical premises and computer systems,
superimposition fraud, and identity theft.

Your Information Security department has developed defensive strategies to counter each of the
above attacks. Each month, you will select one or none of these strategies to employ. Although
each defense strategy counters a specific attack, they also have limited effectiveness against the
other attack strategies. Your defense strategies are not cumulative. Thus, you will begin anew
each month. At the end of each month, you will receive a report indicating the costs of any
information resources that were compromised.
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Appendix C: Help Screen

DEFENDER GAME HELP
PAYOFF MATRIX
The Payoff Matrix indicates the costs of compromised information resources when a particular Defense
Strategy fails. The actual cost depends upon the Defense Strategy chosen and the Attacker's Strategy. The
sample payoff matrix below shows that you will lose $70Million if your Integrity Defense Strategy fails
against a Integrity Attack. However, if your Integrity Defense succeeds, you lose nothing. Two important
items should be noted here. First, when your Defense strategy succeeds, the Attacker gains nothing.
However, when your Defense Strategy fails, the Attacker may or may not gain the same amount that you
have lost (i.e. this is not a zero-sum game). In the below example, if your Integrity Defense strategy fails
and you lose $70Million, the Attacker may only realize a gain of $50Million. Indeed, the Attacker's payoff
matrix may look much different than yours. Thus, you should not immediately assume that the Attacker
values their strategies in the same way that you do.

Integrity Attack
Availability Attack
Confidentiality Attack

Integrity
Defense

Availability
Defense

Confidentiality
Defense

-70
-50
-25

-70
-50
-25

-70
-50
-25

Notice that if your defense strategy does fail, you will be able to determine the strategy that the Attacker
used by noticing how much money you lost. In the above example you would be able to determine that
your opponent used an Integrity Attack.

STRATEGY SUCCESS
Although you cannot directly select your own payoff, you will quickly notice which of your strategies are
more effective (i.e. those that succeed more often). Additionally, your Defense Strategies are more
effective against some attacks than they are against others. Thus, your Integrity Defense may be very
effective against a Integrity Attack, but only moderately effective against a Availability Attack.
The "Approximate Chance of Success" area of your Game screen shows the averaged, approximate chance
of success for each of your strategies. THESE VALUES ARE ONLY A GUIDE TO HELP GET YOU
STARTED. You will notice that Defense Strategies are more effective against particular types of Attacks.
Additionally, you should notice that a Defense Strategy with a low overall chance of success may be very
effective against one type of attack. For instance, the Confidentiality Defense may be very effective against
the Confidentiality Attack (60% or better) but ineffective against other attacks (25% or worse).
A KEY FACTOR IN SELECTING THE BEST STRATEGY IS DETERMINING WHEN YOUR
DEFENSE STRA TEG I ES ARE MOST EFFECTIVE.
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TOOLS HELP
Average Payoff boxes, one for each move, have been place on the upper, right-hand side of the Game Form.
These boxes show the average payoff for each move, averaged over the number of turns that you have
played the move. Each box's average is updated after you use that move. The example below shows how
this works:
Suppose that you have played 5 turns so far, as shown in the table below: (NOTE: All strategies
will be shown on the game form)
TURN
1
2
3
4
5

MOVE
Availability Def.
Integrity Def.
Availability Def.
Integrity Def.
Integrity Def

AVERAGE PAYOFFS

PAYOFF
RECEIVED
0
-75
-25
0
-50

Availability
Availability
Availability
Availability
Availability

Def.
Def
Def.
Def.
Def.

=0
=0
= -12.5
= -12.5
= -12.5

Integrity
Integrity
Integrity
Integrity
Integrity

Def. == 0
Dei. = -75
Def. == -75
Def.; •■ ■ -37.5
Def. == -41.67

Since your goal is to lose as little as possible, you should favor strategies that have an Average Payoff close
to zero. Keep in mind that the Average Payoff will become more accurate as more turns are played.
Below the Average Payoff boxes is a scroll-box that shows the moves and payoffs for each turn of the
game. This box allows you to see what moves you have made previously and what payoff you received for
those moves.
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Appendix D: Questionnaire

Questionnaire

What are the three posrble strategies
employed by your adversaiy, which you must
defend against?

6 [Integrity. Coeision. Confidentiality Attack
£ Coetsion, Availably. Confidentially Attack
8 Integrity. Availability, Confidentially Attack

Your aponents payoll is always equal to your
loss (zeio sum game)?

The goal ol a confidentiality attack on an A«
Foice system is to gather sensitive
information?

Ä True
$ Fake

8 Defend only the most valuable information
S Maximize payoff over the entire gamefleast $ loss)

The goal of the game is to?

S Lose the most information

A key factor ri choosing a defense strategy is
determining when your defense strategy is
most effective?

G

True

S

False

Continue
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Appendix E: Game Forms

Basic

Game Form
Payoff Matrix
Average
Units in Mloris. US $

Payoff

Approximate Chances of Success
DEFEND
Integrity

A Integrity
1
T Availibility
A
Confidentiality
C

K

Availability Confidentiality

None

Integrity Defense

[Better than 75SS

|0

■50

■50

•50

■50

■35

■35

•35

■35

Availably Defense

[Bettei than 75S

|0

■50

•75

■75

•75

Confidentiality Defense

|Betteito75S;

|ü

0

0

0

0

None

3

Select Move:

Less than 255»

None

iDsfendPayoff

Turn iDefendtetion

Make Move

Game Help

Previous Month's Payoffs and Moves
Last Month Payoff; |

±1

Move Success
Total Payoff Received:
Payoff Received:

I

o

Units in Millions. US $

£l
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Full

GatneFoim: Form

Game Form
Payoff Matrix
Average
Urilsh Hirns. US $

Payoff

Approximate Chances ol Success
DEFEND
Integrity

Integrity

■50

Availability Confidentiality

■50

Integrity Defense

Better than 75X

:

IrtegrifyAvaUbBp Defense

Better than 758

;

-50

!nteg(!t>',Confid<ntiaRy Defense

Belt« than 75«

Avatetay Defense

Bettet than 5TK

■62
0
0
0

:

Availab%,Confidenlia!i!y Defense

Bella ihan/SX

0

:

ConfidentiaStsi Defense

Better lhan 50*

0

Inteortj^AvaiabiyXonfiaMality Defense

Bettet than 75*

None

Setter than 25«

0
0

None

-50

Availibility

•35

■35

•35

■35

Confidentiality

■50

•?5

■75

-75

0

0

0

None

Select Move:

!J
~B

Integrity Defense

Move Cost

Make Movcl

]

$5000
Available Funds:

j

$45000

Game Help
Units in Thousands, US $
Previous Month's Payolfs and Moves
Last Month Payoff: I

5

Move Success [Unsuccessful!

i

■62

o

2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12

-1

0
0
■0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0

13

!

VjJ
Total Payoff Received

Payoff Received: I

iDelendPavoff *

Turn I DelenoActcfi
1
Integrity Defense

jfä.

|

/
-62

UrdsinMrScms.USJ

il
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Appendix F: Visual Basic Code
Option Compare Database
Option Explicit
Private Sub Continue_Click()
Dim FindSubject As QueryDef
Dim SubjectRecord As Recordset, ErrorRecord As Recordset
Dim Query As String
Dim Subject As Integer, Counter As Integer
On Error GoTo ErrorHandler
Begin:

If IsNull(SubjectNumber) Then
MsgBox "Please Select Your Name"
Else
Subject = SubjectNumber
Query = "SELECT * FROM Subjects WHERE SubjectID =" & Subject
Set FindSubject = CurrentDb.CreateQueryDef("FindSubject" & Subject, Query)
Set SubjectRecord = FindSubject.OpenRecordset
SubjectRecord.MoveFirst
DefenderBox = SubjectRecord("Defender")
RationalBox = SubjectRecord("Rational")
BudgetBox = SubjectRecord("Budget")
MultiBox = SubjectRecord("Multi")
SubjectRecord.Edit
SubjectRecord("IWExperience") = IWExperience
SubjectRecord("GameExperience") = GameExperience
'SubjectRecord("LastName") = LastNameBox
'SubjectRecord("FirstName") = FirstNameBox
SubjectRecord.Update
CurrentDb.QueryDefs.Delete "FindSubject" & Subject
CurrentDb.QueryDefs.Refresh
DoCmd.OpenForm "GameForm"
DoCmd.OpenForm "Quiz"
DoCmd.OpenForm "DefenderHelp"
If MultiBox = True Then
If BudgetBox = True Then
DoCmd.OpenForm "MultiBudgetScenario"
Else
DoCmd.OpenForm "MultiScenario"
End If
Elself BudgetBox = True Then
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DoCmd.OpenForm "BudgetScenario"
Else
DoCmd.OpenFonn"DefenderScenario"
End If
DoCmd.OpenForm "Instructions"
DoCmd.Maximize
Forms! Quiz !SubjectBox = Subject
DoCmd.Close acForm, "Subjectldentification"
End If
GoTo Out
ErrorHandler:
Set ErrorRecord = CurrentDb.OpenRecordset("Errors", DBOPENDYNASET)
With ErrorRecord
.AddNew
IBlownUpCount = -1 ' Indicates that Error Occurred on Subject ID Form
!ErrorDesc = Err.Description
!ErrorNumber = Err .Number
.Update
End With
ForCounter=lTolOOO
Next Counter
Resume Begin
Out:
End Sub
Private Sub Form_Open(Cancel As Integer)
DoCmd.Maximize

End Sub

Private Sub FeaturesHelpButton_Click()

DoCmd.OpenForm "DefendToolsHelp"
End Sub
Private Sub DmoveBox_Change()
If DMoveBox = "Integrity Defense" Then
MoveCost = Strategy ICostBox
Elself DMoveBox = "Availability Defense" Then
MoveCost = Strategy2CostBox
Elself DMoveBox = "Confidentiality Defense" Then
MoveCost = Strategy3CostBox
Elself DMoveBox = "Integrity,Availability Defense" Then
MoveCost = Strategy ICostBox + Strategy2CostBox
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Eiself DMoveBox = "Integrity,Confidentiality Defense" Then
MoveCost = Strategy ICostBox + Strategy3CostBox
Elself DMoveBox = "Availability,Confidentiality Defense" Then
MoveCost = Strategy2CostBox + Strategy3CostBox
Elself DMoveBox = "Integrity,Availability,Confidentiality Defense" Then
MoveCost = Strategy ICostBox + Strategy2CostBox + Strategy3CostBox
Else: MoveCost = 0
End If
End Sub
Private Sub Form_Open(Cancel As Integer)
Dim Payoff As Integer
Dim i As Integer
Dim Subject As Integer
Dim Match As Integer
Dim Game As Integer, BlownUp As Integer
Dim Defender As Boolean, TableExists As Boolean, Rational As Boolean, Multi As Boolean, Budget As
Boolean
Dim Move 1 Sum As Single, Move2Sum As Single, Move3Sum As Single, Move4Sum As Single,
Move5Sum As Single, Move6Sum As Single, Move7Sum As Single, Move8Sum As Single
Dim Query As String
Dim PayoffRecord, MatchRecord, SuccessRecord, TurnRecord, HistoryRecord As Recordset
Dim ErrorRecord As Recordset
Dim FindPayoff, FindMatch, FindSuccess As QueryDef
Dim MatchTable As TableDef
Dim MatchField As Field
On Error GoTo CommonError
BlownUp = 0
Begin:
DoCmd.Maximize
Defender = Forms!SubjectIdentification!DefenderBox
Rational = Forms!SubjectIdentification!RationalBox
Multi = Forms! SubjectldentificationlMultiBox
Budget = Forms! SubjectIdentification!BudgetBox
Subject = Forms!SubjectIdentification!SubjectNumber
Forms !GameForm!DefenderBox = Defender
Forms!GameForm!RationalBox = Rational
Forms!GameForm!MultipleBox = Multi
Forms !GameForm!BudgetaryBox = Budget
Forms!GameForm!SubjectBox = Subject
TurnBox = 1

MovelLabel.Caption =
Move2Label.Caption =
Move3Label.Caption =
Move4Label. Caption =
Move5Label.Caption =
MoveöLabel.Caption =

"Integrity Defense"
"Integrity,Availability Defense"
"Integrity,Confidentiality Defense"
"Availability Defense"
"Availability,Confidentiality Defense"
"Confidentiality Defense"
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Move7Label.Caption = "Integrity,Availability,Confidentiality Defense"
Move8Label.Caption = "None"
'Set text color to Blue
MovelLabel.ForeColor= 16711680
Move2Label.ForeColor = 16711680
Move3Label.ForeColor = 16711680
Move4Label.ForeColor = 16711680
Move5Label.ForeColor= 16711680
Move6Label.ForeColor = 16711680
Move7Label.ForeColor= 16711680
Move8Label.ForeColor= 16711680
Query = "SELECT * FROM Matches WHERE Defender =" & Subject
DefendHistory. Visible = True
DefendHistory.Enabled = True

If Multi = False Then
Move2Label.Visible = False
Move3Label. Visible = False
Move5Label.Visible = False
Move7Label.Visible = False
Move2Success.Visible = False
Move3Success.Visible = False
Move5Success.Visible = False
Move7Success.Visible = False
Move2Average.Visible = False
Move3Average.Visible = False
Move5Average.Visible = False
Move7Average.Visible = False

SingleMoveBox. Visible = True
SingleMoveBox.Enabled = True
SingleMoveBox.TabStop = True

Elself Multi = True Then

MultiMoveBox. Visible = True
MultiMoveBox.Enabled = True
MultiMoveBox.TabStop = True

End If
Set FindMatch = CurrentDb.CreateQueryDef("FindMatch" & Subject, Query)
Set MatchRecord = FindMatch.OpenRecordset
MatchRecord.MoveFirst
Game = MatchRecord("GameID")
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Match = MatchRecord("MatchID")
GameBox = Game
MatchBox = Match
CurrentDb.QueryDefs.Delete "FindMatch" & Subject
CurrentDb.QueryDefs.Refresh
Query = "SELECT * FROM Payoffs WHERE GamelD =" & Game
Set FindPayoff = CurrentDb.CreateQueryDef("FindPayoff' & Subject, Query)
Set PayoffRecord = FindPayoff. OpenRecordset
PayoffRecord.FindFirst "[Defender] = " & Defender
AlDlPayoff=Str$(PayoffRecord("AlDl"))
AlD2Payoff=Str$(PayoffRecord("AlD2"))
AlD3Payoff=Str$(PayoffRecord("AlD3"))
AlD4Payoff=Str$(PayoffRecord("AlD4"))
A1 D5Payoff = Str$(PayoffRecord(" A1D5"))
A1 D6Payoff = Str$(PayoffRecord(" A1D6"))
A1 D7Payoff = Str$(PayoffRecord("A 1D7"))
A1 D8Payoff = Str$(PayoffRecord(" A1D8"))
A2D1 Payoff =Str$(PayoffRecord("A2Dl"))
A2D2Payoff = Str$(PayoffRecord("A2D2"))
A2D3Payoff=Str$(PayoffRecord("A2D3"))
A2D4Payoff = Str$(PayoffRecord(" A2D4"))
A2D5Payoff=Srr$(PayoffRecord("A2D5"))
A2D6Payoff = Str$(PayoffRecord(" A2D6"))
A2D7Payoff = Str$(PayoffRecord("A2D7"))
A2D8Payoff=Str$(PayoffRecord("A2D8"))
A3D1 Payoff = Str$(PayoffRecord(" A3D1"))
A3D2Payoff = Str$(PayoffRecord("A3D2"))
A3D3Payoff=Str$(PayoffRecord("A3D3"))
A3D4Payoff=Str$(PayoffRecord('A3D4"))
A3D5Payoff=Srr$(PayoffRecord("A3D5"))
A3D6Payoff=Str$(PayoffRecord("A3D6"))
A3D7Payoff=Str$(PayoffRecord("A3D7"))
A3D8Payoff=Str$(PayoffRecord("A3D8"))
A4D1 Payoff =Str$(PayoffRecord("A4Dl"))
A4D2Payoff = Str$(PayoffRecord("A4D2"))
A4D3Payoff=Str$(PayoffRecord("A4D3"))
A4D4Payoff=Str$(PayoffRecord("A4D4"))
A4D5Payoff=Str$(PayoffRecord("A4D5"))
A4D6Payoff = Str$(PayoffRecord("A4D6"))
A4D7Payoff=Str$(PayoffRecord("A4D7"))
A4D8Payoff = Str$(PayoffRecord("A4D8"))
A5D1 Payoff =Str$(PayoffRecord("A5Dl"))
A5D2Payoff = Str$(PayoffRecord("A5D2"))
A5D3Payoff=Str$(PayoffRecord("A5D3"))
A5D4Payoff = Str$(PayoffRecord("A5D4"))
A5D5Payoff=Str$(PayoffRecord("A5D5"))
A5D6Payoff=Str$(PayoffRecord("A5D6"))
A5D7Payoff=Str$(PayoffRecord("A5D7"))
A5D8Payoff = Str$(PayoffRecord("A5D8"))
A6D1 Payoff = Str$(PayoffRecord(" A6D1"))
A6D2Payoff = Str$(PayoffRecord("A6D2"))
A6D3Payoff=Str$(PayoffRecord("A6D3"))
A6D4Payoff = Str$(PayoffRecord(" A6D4"))
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A6D5Payoff =
A6D6Payoff=
A6D7Payoff =
A6D8Payoff =
A7D1 Payoff =
A7D2Payoff =
A7D3Payoff =
A7D4Payoff =
A7D5Payoff =
A7D6Payoff =
A7D7Payoff =
A7D8Payoff =
A8DlPayoff =
A8D2Payoff =
A8D3Payoff =
A8D4Payoff =
A8D5Payoff =
A8D6Payoff =
A8D7Payoff =
A8D8Payoff =

Str$(PayoffRecord( "A6D5"))
Str$(PayoffRecord( "A6D6"))
Str$(PayoffRecord( "A6D7"))
Str$(PayoffRecord( "A6D8"))
Str$(PayoffRecord( "A7D1"))
Str$(PayoffRecord( "A7D2"))
Str$(PayoffRecord( "A7D3"))
Str$(PayoffRecord( "A7D4"))
Str$(PayoffRecord( "A7D5"))
Str$(PayoffRecord( "A7D6"))
Str$(PayoffRecord( "A7D7"))
Str$(PayoffRecord( "A7D8"))
Str$(PayoffRecord( "A8D1"))
Str$(PayoffRecord( "A8D2"))
Str$(PayoffRecord( "A8D3"))
Str$(PayoffRecord( "A8D4"))
Str$(PayoffRecord( "A8D5"))
Str$(PayoffRecord( "A8D6"))
Str$(PayoffRecord( "A8D7"))
Str$(PayoffRecord( "A8D8"))

CurrentDb.QueryDefs.Delete "FindPayoff' & Subject
CurrentDb.QueryDefs.Refresh
Query = "SELECT * FROM Success WHERE GamelD =" & Game
Set FindSuccess = CurrentDb.CreateQueryDef("FindSuccess" & Subject, Query)
Set SuccessRecord = FindSuccess.OpenRecordset
SuccessRecord.FindFirst "[Defender] =" & Defender
AID 1 Success = Str$(SuccessRecord(" A1D1")
AlD2Success = Str$(SuccessRecord("AlD2")
AlD3Success = Str$(SuccessRecord("AlD3"
AlD4Success = Str$(SuccessRecord("AlD4"
AlD5Success = Str$(SuccessRecord("AlD5"
AlD6Success = Str$(SuccessRecord("AlD6"
AlD7Success = Str$(SuccessRecord("AlD7"
AlD8Success = Str$(SuccessRecord("AlD8"
A2D1 Success = Str$(SuccessRecord("A2Dl"
A2D2Success = Str$(SuccessRecord("A2D2"
A2D3Success = Str$(SuccessRecord("A2D3"
A2D4Success = Str$(SuccessRecord("A2D4"
A2D5Success = Str$(SuccessRecord("A2D5"
A2D6Success = Str$(SuccessRecord("A2D6"
A2D7Success = Str$(SuccessRecord("A2D7"
A2D8Success = Str$(SuccessRecord("A2D8"
A3D1 Success = Str$(SuccessRecord("A3Dl"
A3D2Success = Str$(SuccessRecord("A3D2"
A3D3Success = Str$(SuccessRecord("A3D3"
A3D4Success = Str$(SuccessRecord("A3D4"
A3D5Success = Str$(SuccessRecord("A3D5"
A3D6Success = Str$(SuccessRecord("A3D6"
A3D7Success = Str$(SuccessRecord("A3D7"
A3D8Success = Str$(SuccessRecord("A3D8"
A4D1 Success = Str$(SuccessRecord("A4Dl"
A4D2Success = Str$(SuccessRecord("A4D2"
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A4D3Success = Str$(SuccessRecord("A4D3"))
A4D4Success = Str$(SuccessRecord("A4D4"))
A4D5 Success = Str$(SuccessRecord("A4D5"))
A4D6Success = Str$(SuccessRecord("A4D6"))
A4D7Success = Str$(SuccessRecord("A4D7"))
A4D8Success = Str$(SuccessRecord("A4D8"))
A5D1 Success = Str$(SuccessRecord("A5Dl"))
A5D2Success = Str$(SuccessRecord("A5D2"))
A5D3Success = Str$(SuccessRecord("A5D3"))
A5D4Success = Str$(SuccessRecord("A5D4"))
A5D5Success = Str$(SuccessRecord("A5D5"))
A5D6Success = Str$(SuccessRecord("A5D6"))
A5D7Success = Str$(SuccessRecord("A5D7"))
A5D8Success = Str$(SuccessRecord("A5D8"))
A6D1 Success = Str$(SuccessRecord("A6Dl"))
A6D2Success = Str$(SuccessRecord("A6D2"))
A6D3Success = Str$(SuccessRecord("A6D3"))
A6D4Success = Str$(SuccessRecord("A6D4"))
A6D5Success = Str$(SuccessRecord("A6D5"))
A6D6Success = Str$(SuccessRecord("A6D6"))
A6D7Success = Str$(SuccessRecord("A6D7"))
A6D8Success = Str$(SuccessRecord("A6D8"))
A7D1 Success = Str$(SuccessRecord("A7Dl"))
A7D2Success = Str$(SuccessRecord("A7D2"))
A7D3Success = Str$(SuccessRecord("A7D3"))
A7D4Success = Str$(SuccessRecord("A7D4"))
A7D5Success = Str$(SuccessRecord("A7D5"))
A7D6Success = Str$(SuccessRecord("A7D6"))
A7D7Success = Str$(SuccessRecord("A7D7"))
A7D8Success = Str$(SuccessRecord("A7D8"))
A8D1 Success = Str$(SuccessRecord("A8Dl"))
A8D2Success = Str$(SuccessRecord("A8D2"))
A8D3Success = Str$(SuccessRecord("A8D3"))
A8D4Success = Str$(SuccessRecord("A8D4"))
A8D5Success = Str$(SuccessRecord("A8D5"))
A8D6Success = Str$(SuccessRecord("A8D6"))
A8D7Success = Str$(SuccessRecord("A8D7"))
A8D8Success = Str$(SuccessRecord("A8D8"))

IfMulti = True Then
MovelSum = SuccessRecord("AlDl") + SuccessRecord("A2Dl") + SuccessRecord("A3Dl") +
SuccessRecord("A4Dl") + SuccessRecord("A5Dl") + SuccessRecord("A6Dl") + SuccessRecord("A7Dl")
+ SuccessRecord("A8Dl")
Move2Sum= SuccessRecord("AlD2") + SuccessRecord("A2D2") + SuccessRecord("A3D2") +
SuccessRecord("A4D2") + SuccessRecord("A5D2") + SuccessRecord("A6D2") + SuccessRecord("A7D2")
+ SuccessRecord("A8D2")
Move3Sum = SuccessRecord("AlD3") + SuccessRecord("A2D3") + SuccessRecord("A3D3") +
SuccessRecord("A4D3") + SuccessRecord("A5D3") + SuccessRecord("A6D3") + SuccessRecord("A7D3")
+ SuccessRecord("A8D3")
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Move4Sum = SuccessRecord("AlD4") + SuccessRecord("A2D4") + SuccessRecord("A3D4") +
SuccessRecord("A4D4") + SuccessRecord("A5D4") + SuccessRecord("A6D4") + SuccessRecord("A7D4")
+ SuccessRecord("A8D4")
Move5Sum = SuccessRecord("AlD5") + SuccessRecord("A2D5") + SuccessRecord("A3D5") +
SuccessRecord("A4D5") + SuccessRecord("A5D5") + SuccessRecord("A6D5") + SuccessRecord("A7D5")
+ SuccessRecord("A8D5")
Move6Sum = SuccessRecord("AlD6") + SuccessRecord(MA2D6") + SuccessRecord("A3D6") +
SuccessRecord("A4D6") + SuccessRecord("A5D6") + SuccessRecord("A6D6") + SuccessRecord("A7D6")
+ SuccessRecord(MA8D6")
Move7Sum = SuccessRecord("AlD7") + SuccessRecord("A2D7") + SuccessRecord("A3D7") +
SuccessRecord("A4D7") + SuccessRecord(MA5D7") + SuccessRecord("A6D7") + SuccessRecord("A7D7")
+ SuccessRecord("A8D7")
Move8Sum = SuccessRecord("AlD8") + SuccessRecord("A2D8") + SuccessRecord("A3D8") +
SuccessRecord("A4D8") + SuccessRecord("A5D8") + SuccessRecord("A6D8") + SuccessRecord("A7D8")
+ SuccessRecord("A8D8")
Else
MovelSum = SuccessRecord("AlDl") + SuccessRecord("A4Dl") + SuccessRecord('A6Dl") +
SuccessRecord("A8Dl")
Move4Sum = SuccessRecord("AlD4") + SuccessRecord("A4D4") + SuccessRecord("A6D4") +
SuccessRecord("A8D4")
Move6Sum = SuccessRecord("AlD6") + SuccessRecord("A4D6") + SuccessRecord("A6D6") +
SuccessRecord("A8D6")
Move8Sum = SuccessRecord("AlD8") + SuccessRecord("A4D8") + SuccessRecord("A6D8") +
SuccessRecord("A8D8")
End If

CurrentDb.QueryDefs.Delete "FindSuccess" & Subject
CurrentDb.QueryDefs.Refresh
Query = "SELECT * FROM Games WHERE GamelD =" & Game
Set FindGames = CurrentDb.CreateQueryDef("FindGames" & Subject, Query)
Set GamesRecord = FindGames.OpenRecordset
Percentl = Str$(GamesRecord("APercentl"))
Percent2 = Str$(GamesRecord("APercent2"))
Strategyl = GamesRecord!AStrategyl
Strategy2 = GamesRecord!AStrategy2
Strategy3 = GamesRecord!AStrategy3
If Budget = True Then
IncomeBox = GamesRecord! Income
Strategyl CostBox = GamesRecord!StrategylCost
Strategy2CostBox = GamesRecord !Strategy2Cost
Strategy3 CostBox = GamesRecord! Strategy3Cost
BudgetBox = IncomeBox
BudgetBox.Visible = True
Label252.Visible = True
Label 122. Visible = True
Label247 Visible = True
MoveCost. Visible = True
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End If

CurrentDb.QueryDefs.Delete "FindGames" & Subject
CurrentDb.QueryDefs.Refresh
If Multi = Trae Then
If Move 1 Sum >= 5 Then
Move 1 Success = "Better than 75%"
Elself Move 1 Sum >= 4 Then
Move 1 Success = "Better than 50%"
Elself Move 1 Sum >= 2 Then
Move 1 Success = "Better than 25%"
Else
Move 1 Success = "Less than 25%"
End If
IfMove2Sum>=5Then
Move2Success = "Better than 75%"
Elself Move2Sum >= 4 Then
Move2Success = "Better than 50%"
Elself Move2 Sum >= 2 Then
Move2Success = "Better than 25%"
Else
Move2Success = "Less than 25%"
End If
If Move3Sum >= 5 Then
Move3Success = "Better than 75%"
Elself Move3 Sum >= 4 Then
Move3 Success = "Better than 50%"
Elself Move3 Sum >= 2 Then
Move3Success = "Better than 25%"
Else
Move3Success = "Less than 25%"
End If
If Move4Sum >= 5 Then
Move4Success = "Better than 75%"
Elself Move4Sum >= 4 Then
Move4Success = "Better than 50%"
Elself Move4Sum >= 2 Then
Move4Success = "Better than 25%"
Else
Move4Success = "Less than 25%"
End If
If Move5Sum >= 5 Then
Move5Success = "Better than 75%"
Elself Move5 Sum >= 4 Then
Move5 Success = "Better than 50%"
Elself Move5 Sum >= 2 Then
Move5Success = "Better than 25%"
Else
Move5Success = "Less than 25%"
End If
If MoveöSum >= 5 Then
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Move6Success = "Better than 75%"
Elself MoveöSum >= 4 Then
Move6Success = "Better than 50%"
Elself MoveöSum >= 2 Then
Move6Success = "Better than 25%"
Else
Move6Success = "Less than 25%"
End If
IfMove7Sum>=5Then
Move7Success = "Better than 75%"
Elself Move7Sum >= 4 Then
Move7Success = "Better than 50%"
Elself Move7Sum >= 2 Then
Move7Success = "Better than 25%"
Else
Move7Success = "Less than 25%"
End If
IfMove8Sum>=5Then
Move8Success = "Better than 75%"
Elself Move8Sum >= 4 Then
Move8Success = "Better than 50%"
Elself Move8Sum >= 2 Then
Move8Success = "Better than 25%"
Else
Move8Success = "Less than 25%"
End If

Else
If MovelSum >= 2.75 Then
Move 1 Success = "Better than 75%"
Elself MovelSum >= 2.5 Then
Movel Success = "Better than 50%"
Elself MovelSum >= 2 Then
Movel Success = "Better than 25%"
Else
Movel Success = "Less than 25%"
End If
If Move4Sum >= 2.75 Then
Move4Success = "Better than 75%"
Elself Move4Sum >= 2.5 Then
Move4Success = "Better than 50%"
Elself Move4Sum >= 2 Then
Move4Success = "Better than 25%"
Else
Move4Success = "Less than 25%"
End If
If Move6Sum >= 2.75 Then
Move6Success = "Better than 75%"
Elself MoveöSum >= 2.5 Then
Move6Success = "Better than 50%"
Elself MoveöSum >= 2 Then
MoveöSuccess = "Better than 25%"
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Else
MoveöSuccess = "Less than 25%"
End If
If Move8Sum >= 2.75 Then
Move8Success = "Better than 75%"
Elself Move8Sum >= 2.5 Then
Move8Success = "Better than 50%"
Elself Move8Sum >= 2 Then
Move8Success = "Better than 25%"
Else
Move8Success = "Less than 25%"
End If
End If

'Set up match payoff table for defender - attacker will simply link to it
If Defender = True Then
'Check if Match Table already exists
TableExists = False
For Each MatchTable In CurrentDb.TableDefs
If MatchTable.Name = "Match" & Match Then
TableExists = True
End If
Next
If TableExists = False Then
Set MatchTable = CurrentDb.CreateTableDef("Match" & Match)
Set MatchField = MatchTable.CreateField("Turn")
MatchField.Type = DBJNTEGER
MatchTable.Fields.Append MatchField
Set MatchField = MatchTable.CreateField("SuccessNumber")
MatchField.Type = DB_SINGLE
MatchTable.Fields.Append MatchField
Set MatchField = MatchTable.CreateField("DefenderMoved")
MatchField.Type = DB_BOOLEAN
MatchField.DefaultValue = False
MatchTable.Fields.Append MatchField
Set MatchField = MatchTable.CreateField("DefenseSuccess")
MatchField.Type = DBBOOLEAN
MatchField.DefaultValue = False
MatchTable.Fields.Append MatchField
Set MatchField = MatchTable.CreateField("AMove")
MatchField.Type = DBJTEXT
MatchField.AllowZeroLength = True
MatchTable.Fields.Append MatchField
Set MatchField = MatchTable.CreateField("DMove")
MatchField.Type = DBJTEXT
MatchField.AllowZeroLength = True
MatchTable.Fields.Append MatchField
CurrentDb.TableDefs.Append MatchTable
CurrentDb.TableDefs.Refresh
Set TurnRecord = CurrentDb.OpenRecordset("Match" & Match)
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Set HistoryRecord = CurrentDb.OpenRecordset("History")
For i = 1 To 50
'Now create turn Entries
TurnRecord.AddNew
TurnRecord("Turn") = i
TumRecordC'AMove") =""
TurnRecord("DMove") =""
TurnRecord.Update
'Setup History Table Records
HistoryRecord.AddNew
HistoryRecord("MatchID") = Match
HistoryRecord("Turn") = i
HistoryRecord.Update
Next
End If
End If
GoTo Out' skip error handling
'Labels Section
CommonError:
If BlownUp > 50 Then
Resume Fatal
Elself Err.Number = 3012 Then
If StrComp(Query, "SELECT * FROM Matches WHERE Defender =" & Subject) = 0 Then
CurrentDb.QueryDefs.Delete "FindMatch" & Subject
CurrentDb.QueryDefs.Refresh
Elself StrComp(Query, "SELECT * FROM Matches WHERE Attacker =" & Subject) = 0 Then
CurrentDb.QueryDefs.Delete "FindMatch" & Subject
CurrentDb.QueryDefs.Refresh
Elself StrComp(Query, "SELECT * FROM Payoffs WHERE GamelD =" & Game) = 0 Then
CurrentDb.QueryDefs.Delete "FindPayoff' & Subject
CurrentDb.QueryDefs.Refresh
Elself StrComp(Query, "SELECT * FROM Success WHERE GamelD =" & Game) = 0 Then
CurrentDb.QueryDefs.Delete "FindSuccess" & Subject
CurrentDb.QueryDefs.Refresh
End If
Resume Begin
Else
BlownUp = BlownUp + 1
Set ErrorRecord = CurrentDb.OpenRecordset("Errors", DB_OPEN_DYNASET)
With ErrorRecord
.AddNew
IBlownUpCount = BlownUp
!ErrorDesc = Err.Description
lErrorNumber = Err.Number
.Update
End With
Resume Begin
End If
Fatal:
MsgBox "An Error has Occurred in FormGameForm: Class Module LoadForm. Notify Experimenter"
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GoTo Out
Out:
End Sub
Private Sub GameHelpButton_Click()

DoCmd.OpenForm "DefenderHelp"

End Sub
Public Sub MakeMove_Click()
Dim MatchReady As Boolean
Dim Defender As Boolean, Rational As Boolean, Multi As Boolean, Budget As Boolean
Dim AttackerMove As String, DefenderMove As String, MoveString As String
Dim InitPayoff As Integer, i As Integer, MsgResponse As Integer, BlownUp As Integer, WaitCount As
Integer
Dim Turn As Integer, Match As Integer, Game As Integer
Dim AttackerPayoff As Single, DefenderPayoff As Single, SuccessProb As Single
Dim RandomNumber As Single
Dim TurnRecord As Recordset, ErrorRecord As Recordset
Dim MatchTable As TableDef
Dim AttackValue As Single

On Error GoTo ErrorHandler

Begin:
BlownUp = 0
Defender = Forms!GameForm!DefenderBox
Rational = Forms!GameForm!RationalBox
Multi = Forms !GameForm!MultipleBox
Budget = Forms!GameForm!BudgetaryBox
Turn = Forms !GameForm!TurnBox
Match = Forms!GameForm!MatchBox
Game = Forms!GameForm!GameBox
If Multi = True Then
DMoveBox = MultiMoveBox
Else
DMoveBox = SingleMoveBox
End If
If IsNull(DMoveBox) Then
GoTo No_Move
Elself Budget = True Then
test = CalcBudget(DMoveBox, Multi)
If test = False Then
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GoTo Out
End If
End If
If Rational = True Then
Randomize
AttackValue = Rnd
AttackValueb ox = AttackValue
If AttackValue <= Forms!GameForm!Percentl Then
AttackerMove = Forms!GameForm!Strategyl
Elself AttackValue <= Forms!GameForm!Percent2 Then
AttackerMove = Forms !GameForm!Strategy2
Else
AttackerMove = Forms !GameForm!Strategy3
End If
Else
Randomize
AttackValue = Int((8 * Rnd) + 1)
IfAttackValue = "l"Then
AttackerMove = "Al"
Elself AttackValue = "2" Then
AttackerMove = "A2"
Elself AttackValue = "3" Then
AttackerMove = "A3"
Elself AttackValue = "4" Then
AttackerMove = "A4"
Elself AttackValue = "5" Then
AttackerMove = "A5"
Elself AttackValue = "6" Then
AttackerMove = "A6"
Elself AttackValue = "7" Then
AttackerMove = "A7"
Else
AttackerMove = "A8"
End If
End If
attackbox = AttackerMove
DefenderMove = ConvertMove(DMoveBox, True)
defendbox = DefenderMove
Set TurnRecord = CurrentDb.OpenRecordset("Match" & Match, DBOPENDYNASET)
TurnRecord.FindFirst "[Turn] = " & Turn
WaitCount = 0
While TurnRecord.EditMode = dbEditlnProgress
If WaitCount > 40000 Then
MsgResponse = MsgBox("Move processing may be taking too long. Notify the Experimenter.
Continue Waiting?", vbYesNo)
If MsgResponse = vbYes Then
WaitCount = 0
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Else
GoTo Out
End If
End If
WaitCount = WaitCount + 1
Wend
TurnRecord.Edit
TurnRecord("DMove") = DefenderMove
TurnRecord("AMove") = AttackerMove
TurnRecord.Update
DoCmd.Hourglass True
WaitCount = 0

DoCmd.Hourglass False
'Get Initial Payoff
MoveString = AttackerMove & DefenderMove
InitPayoff = FindPayoff(MoveString)
SuccessProb = FindSuccess(MoveString)
WaitCount = 0
While TurnRecord.EditMode = dbEditlnProgress
If WaitCount > 40000 Then
MsgResponse = MsgBox("Move processing may be taking too long. Notify the Experimenter.
Continue Waiting?", vbYesNo)
If MsgResponse = vbYes Then
WaitCount = 0
Else
GoTo Out
End If
End If
WaitCount = WaitCount + 1
Wend
TurnRecord.Edit
Randomize
TurnRecord("SuccessNumber") = Rnd()
If TurnRecord("SuccessNumber") < SuccessProb Then
DefenderPayoff = 0
TurnRecord("DefenseSuccess") = True
MoveSuccessBox = "Successful!"
Else
DefenderPayoff = InitPayoff
TurnRecord("DefenseSuccess") = False
MoveSuccessBox = "Unsuccessful!"
End If
TurnRecordf'DefenderMoved") = True
TurnRecord.Update
TurnRecord.Close
LastPayoffBox = PayoffBox
Payoffßox = DefenderPayoff
TotalPayoffBox = TotalPayoffBox + DefenderPayoff
Call UpdateHistory(AttackerMove, DefenderPayoff, DefenderMove, Match, Turn)
Beep
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'Check if 50 turns completed
IfTurn = 50Then
MsgBox "You Have Completed The Experiment. Please Close the Program. Thanks for Your
Participation"
Application.Quit acPrompt
GoTo Out
End If
'Normal End of Turn Processing
Turn = Turn + 1
Forms!GameForm!TurnBox = Turn
GoTo Out
'LABELS SECTION
No_Move:
MsgBox "Please Select a Move!"
If Multi = True Then
MultiMoveBox.SetFocus
Else
SingleMoveBox.SetFocus
End If
GoTo Out
ErrorHandler:

Resume Begin
'BlownUp = BlownUp + 1
'Set ErrorRecord = CurrentDb.OpenRecordset("Errors", DBOPENDYNASET)
' With ErrorRecord
' .AddNew
' !BlownUpCount = BlownUp
' !ErrorDesc = Err.Description
' !ErrorNumber = Err .Number
' .Update
'End With
' Resume

Abort:
MsgBox "Experiment Terminated!"
DoCmd.Hourglass False
DoCmd.Close acForm, "GameForm"
Out:
End Sub
Public Function FindPayoff(Move As String) As Integer
IfMove = "AlDl"Then
FindPayoff = Int(Forms! GameForm! A1D1 Payoff)
ElseIfMove = "AlD2"Then
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FindPayoff=Int(Fomis!GameForm!AlD2Payoff)
Elself Move = "AlD3" Then
FindPayoff = Int(Forms!GameForm!AlD3Payoff)
Elself Move = "A1D4" Then
FindPayoff = Int(Forms! GameForm! A1 D4Payoff)
Elself Move = "A1D5" Then
FindPayoff = Int(Forms! GameForm! A1 D5Payoff)
Elself Move = "A1D6" Then
FindPayoff = Int(Forms! GameForm! A1 D6Payoff)
Elself Move = "A1D7" Then
FindPayoff =Int(Forms!GameForm!AlD7Payoff)
Elself Move = "A1D8" Then
FindPayoff =Int(Forms!GameForm!AlD8Payoff)
Elself Move = "A2D1" Then
FindPayoff = Int(Forms! GameForm! A2D lPayoff)
Elself Move = "A2D2" Then
FindPayoff = Int(Forms! GameForm! A2D2Payoff)
Elself Move = "A2D3" Then
FindPayoff =Int(Forms!GameForm!A2D3Payoff)
Elself Move = "A2D4" Then
FindPayoff = Int(Forms! GameForm! A2D4Payoff)
Elself Move = "A2D5" Then
FindPayoff = Int(Forms! GameForm! A2D5Payoff)
Elself Move = "A2D6" Then
FindPayoff = Int(Forms! GameForm! A2D6Payoff)
Elself Move = "A2D7" Then
FindPayoff =Int(Forms!GameForm!A2D7Payoff)
Elself Move = "A2D8" Then
FindPayoff =Int(Forms!GameForm!A2D8Payoff)
Elself Move = "A3D1" Then
FindPayoff =Int(Forms!GameForm!A3DlPayoff)
Elself Move = "A3D2" Then
FindPayoff =Int(Forms!GameForm!A3D2Payoff)
Elself Move = "A3D3" Then
FindPayoff = Int(Forms!GameForm!A3D3Payoff)
Elself Move = "A3D4" Then
FindPayoff =Int(Forms!GameForm!A3D4Payoff)
Elself Move = "A3D5" Then
FindPayoff =Int(Forms!GameForm!A3D5Payoff)
Elself Move = "A3D6" Then
FindPayoff =Int(Forms!GameForm!A3D6Payoff)
Elself Move = "A3D7" Then
FindPayoff = Int(Forms! GameForm! A3D7Payoff)
Elself Move = "A3D8" Then
FindPayoff =Int(Forms!GameForm!A3D8Payoff)
Elself Move = "A4D1" Then
FindPayoff = Int(Forms! GameForm! A4D1 Payoff)
Elself Move = "A4D2" Then
FindPayoff = Int(Forms!GameForm!A4D2Payoff)
Elself Move = "A4D3" Then
FindPayoff = Int(Forms! GameForm! A4D3Payoff)
Elself Move = "A4D4" Then
FindPayoff =Int(Forms!GameForm!A4D4Payoff)
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Elself Move = "A4D5" Then
FindPayoff =Int(Forms!GameForm!A4D5Payoff)
Elself Move = "A4D6" Then
FindPayoff = Int(Forms! GameForm! A4D6Payoff)
Elself Move = "A4D7" Then
FindPayoff = Int(Forms! GameForm! A4D7Payoff)
Elself Move = "A4D8" Then
FindPayoff = Int(Forms! GameForm! A4D8Payoff)
Elself Move = "A5D1" Then
FindPayoff =Int(Forms!GameForrn!A5DlPayoff)
Elself Move = "A5D2" Then
FindPayoff =Int(Forms!GameForm!A5D2Payoff)
Elself Move = "A5D3" Then
FindPayoff = Int(Forms! GameForm! A5D3Payoff)
Elself Move = "A5D4" Then
FindPayoff = Int(Forms! GameForm! A5D4Payoff)
Elself Move = "A5D5" Then
FindPayoff =Int(Forms!GameForm!A5D5Payoff)
Elself Move = "A5D6" Then
FindPayoff = Int(Forms! GameForm! A5D6Payoff)
Elself Move = "A5D7" Then
FindPayoff = Int(Forms! GameForm! A5D7Payoff)
Elself Move = "A5D8" Then
FindPayoff =Int(Forms!GameForm!A5D8Payoff)
Elself Move = "A6D1" Then
FindPayoff = Int(Forms! GameForm! A6D1 Payoff)
Elself Move = "A6D2" Then
FindPayoff =Int(Forms!GameForm!A6D2Payoff)
Elself Move = "A6D3" Then
FindPayoff =Int(Forms!GameForm!A6D3Payoff)
Elself Move = "A6D4" Then
FindPayoff = Int(Forms! GameForm! A6D4Payoff)
Elself Move = "A6D5" Then
FindPayoff = Int(Forms! GameForm! A6D5Payoff)
Elself Move = "A6D6" Then
FindPayoff = Int(Forms!GameForm!A6D6Payoff)
Elself Move = "A6D7" Then
FindPayoff =Int(Forms!GameForm!A6D7Payoff)
Elself Move = "A6D8" Then
FindPayoff =Int(Forms!GameForm!A6D8Payoff)
Elself Move = "A7D1" Then
FindPayoff = Int(Forms! GameForm! A7D1 Payoff)
Elself Move = "A7D2" Then
FindPayoff = Int(Forms!GameForm!A7D2Payoff)
Elself Move = "A7D3" Then
FindPayoff =Int(Forms!GameForm!A7D3Payoff)
Elself Move = "A7D4" Then
FindPayoff = Int(Forms! GameForm! A7D4Payoff)
Elself Move = "A7D5" Then
FindPayoff = Int(Forms! GameForm! A7D5Payoff)
Elself Move = "A7D6" Then
FindPayoff = Int(Forms! GameForm! A7D6Payoff)
Elself Move = "A7D7" Then
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FindPayoff = Int(Forms!GameForm!A7D7Payoff)
Elself Move = "A7D8" Then
FindPayoff =Int(Forms!GameForm!A7D8Payoff)
Elself Move = "A8D1" Then
FindPayoff = Int(Forms IGameForm! A8D1 Payoff)
Elself Move = "A8D2" Then
FindPayoff = Int(Forms! GameForm!A8D2Payoff)
Elself Move = "A8D3" Then
FindPayoff =Int(Forms!GameForm!A8D3Payoff)
Elself Move = "A8D4" Then
FindPayoff = Int(Forms!GameForm!A8D4Payoff)
Elself Move = "A8D5" Then
FindPayoff = Int(Forms!GameForm!A8D5Payoff)
Elself Move = "A8D6" Then
FindPayoff = Int(Forms! GameForm!A8D6Payoff)
Elself Move = "A8D7" Then
FindPayoff = Int(Forms!GameFonn! A8D7Payoff)
Elself Move = "A8D8" Then
FindPayoff = Int(Forms! GameForm!A8D8Payoff)
End If
End Function
Public Function FindSuccess(Move As String) As Single
IfMove = "AlDl"Then
FindSuccess = Forms!GameForm!AlDlSuccess
Elself Move = "A1D2" Then
FindSuccess = Forms!GameForm!AlD2Success
Elself Move = "A1D3" Then
FindSuccess = Forms!GameForm!AlD3Success
Elself Move = "A1D4" Then
FindSuccess = Forms!GameForm!AlD4Success
Elself Move = "A1D5" Then
FindSuccess = Forms!GameForm!AlD5Success
Elself Move = "A1D6" Then
FindSuccess = Forms!GameForm!AlD6Success
Elself Move = "A1D7" Then
FindSuccess = Forms!GameForm!AlD7Success
Elself Move = "A1D8" Then
FindSuccess = Forms IGameForm! A lD8Success
Elself Move = "A2D1" Then
FindSuccess = Forms!GameForm!A2Dl Success
Elself Move = "A2D2" Then
FindSuccess = Forms!GameForm!A2D2Success
Elself Move = "A2D3" Then
FindSuccess = Forms!GameForm!A2D3Success
Elself Move = "A2D4" Then
FindSuccess = Forms!GameForm!A2D4Success
Elself Move = "A2D5" Then
FindSuccess = Forms!GameForm!A2D5Success
Elself Move = "A2D6" Then
FindSuccess = Forms!GameForm!A2D6Success
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Elself Move = "A2D7" Then
FindSuccess = Forms !GameForm!A2D7Success
Elself Move = "A2D8" Then
FindSuccess = Forms!GameForm!A2D8Success
Elself Move = "A3D1" Then
FindSuccess = Forms !GameForm!A3Dl Success
Elself Move = "A3D2" Then
FindSuccess = Forms !GameForm!A3D2Success
Elself Move = "A3D3" Then
FindSuccess = Forms!GameForm!A3D3Success
Elself Move = "A3D4" Then
FindSuccess = Forms!GameForm!A3D4Success
Elself Move = "A3D5" Then
FindSuccess = Forms!GameForm!A3D5Success
Elself Move = "A3D6" Then
FindSuccess = Forms!GameForm!A3D6Success
Elself Move = "A3D7" Then
FindSuccess = Forms!GameForm!A3D7Success
Elself Move = "A3D8" Then
FindSuccess = Forms!GameForm!A3D8Success
Elself Move = "A4D1" Then
FindSuccess = Forms!GameForm!A4DlSuccess
Elself Move = "A4D2" Then
FindSuccess = Forms !GameForm!A4D2Success
Elself Move = "A4D3" Then
FindSuccess = Forms !GameForm!A4D3 Success
Elself Move = "A4D4" Then
FindSuccess = Forms !GameForm!A4D4Success
Elself Move = "A4D5" Then
FindSuccess = Forms!GameForm!A4D5Success
Elself Move = "A4D6" Then
FindSuccess = Forms!GameForm!A4D6Success
Elself Move = "A4D7" Then
FindSuccess = Forms!GameForm!A4D7Success
Elself Move = "A4D8" Then
FindSuccess = Forms!GameForm!A4D8Success
Elself Move = "A5D1" Then
FindSuccess = Forms!GameForm!A5DlSuccess
Elself Move = "A5D2" Then
FindSuccess = Forms!GameForm!A5D2Success
Elself Move = "A5D3" Then
FindSuccess = Forms!GameForm!A5D3Success
Elself Move = "A5D4" Then
FindSuccess = Forms!GameForm!A5D4Success
Elself Move = "A5D5" Then
FindSuccess = Forms !GameForm!A5D5 Success
Elself Move = "A5D6" Then
FindSuccess = Forms !GameForm!A5D6Success
Elself Move = "A5D7" Then
FindSuccess = Forms!GameForm!A5D7Success
Elself Move = "A5D8" Then
FindSuccess = Forms!GameForm!A5D8Success
Elself Move = "A6D1" Then
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FindSuccess = Forms!GameForm!A6DlSuccess
Elself Move = "A6D2" Then
FindSuccess = Forms!GameForm!A6D2Success
Elself Move = "A6D3" Then
FindSuccess = Forms !GameForm!A6D3 Success
Elself Move = "A6D4" Then
FindSuccess = Forms!GameForm!A6D4Success
Elself Move = "A6D5" Then
FindSuccess = Forms!GameForm!A6D5Success
Elself Move = "A6D6" Then
FindSuccess = Forms!GameForm!A6D6Success
Elself Move = "A6D7" Then
FindSuccess = Forms!GameForm!A6D7Success
Elself Move = "A6D8" Then
FindSuccess = Forms!GameForm!A6D8Success
Elself Move = "A7D1" Then
FindSuccess = Forms !GameForm!A7Dl Success
Elself Move = "A7D2" Then
FindSuccess = Forms!GameForm!A7D2Success
Elself Move = "A7D3" Then
FindSuccess = Forms!GameForm!A7D3Success
Elself Move = "A7D4" Then
FindSuccess = Forms!GameForm!A7D4Success
Elself Move = "A7D5" Then
FindSuccess = Forms!GameForm!A7D5Success
Elself Move = "A7D6" Then
FindSuccess = Forms!GameForm!A7D6Success
Elself Move = "A7D7" Then
FindSuccess = Forms!GameForm!A7D7Success
Elself Move = "A7D8" Then
FindSuccess = Forms!GameForm!A7D8Success
Elself Move = "A8D1" Then
FindSuccess = Forms!GameForm!A8DlSuccess
Elself Move = "A8D2" Then
FindSuccess = Forms!GameForm!A8D2Success
Elself Move = "A8D3" Then
FindSuccess = Forms!GameForm!A8D3Success
Elself Move = "A8D4" Then
FindSuccess = Forms !GameForm!A8D4Success
Elself Move = "A8D5" Then
FindSuccess = Forms !GameForm!A8D5Success
Elself Move = "A8D6" Then
FindSuccess = Forms!GameForm!A8D6Success
Elself Move = "A8D7" Then
FindSuccess = Forms!GameForm!A8D7Success
Elself Move = "A8D8" Then
FindSuccess = Forms!GameForm!A8D8Success
End If
End Function
Public Sub UpdateHistory(AttMove As String, DPayoff As Single, DefMove As String, Match As Integer,
Turn As Integer)
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Dim HistoryQuery As QueryDef
Dim HistoryRecord As Recordset, ErrorRecord As Recordset
Dim Query As String
Dim BlownUp As Integer
On Error GoTo ErrorHandler
BlownUp = 0
Begin:
If AttMove = "Al" Then
AttMoveH = "Integrity Attack"
Elself AttMove = "A2" Then
AttMoveH = "IntegrityAvailability Attack"
Elself AttMove = "A3" Then
AttMoveH = "Integrity,Confidentiality Attack"
Elself AttMove = "A4" Then
AttMoveH = "Availability Attack"
Elself AttMove = "A5" Then
AttMoveH = "Availability,Confidentiality Attack"
Elself AttMove = "A6" Then
AttMoveH = "Confidentiality Attack"
Elself AttMove = "A7" Then
AttMoveH = "Integrity,Availability,Confidentiality Attack"
Elself AttMove = "A8" Then
AttMoveH = "None"
End If
IfDefMove = "Dl"Then
DefMoveH = "Integrity Defense"
Forms!GameForm!MovelTurns = Forms !GameForm! Move 1 Turns + 1
Forms!GameForm!MovelPayoffs = Forms !GameForm!Movel Payoffs + DPayoff
Forms!GameForm!MovelAverage = Forms!GameForm!MovelPayoffs /
Forms! GameFormlMove 1 Turns
Elself DefMove = "D2" Then
DefMoveH = "Integrity,Availability Defense"
Forms!GameForm!Move2Turns = Forms !GameForm!Move2Turns + 1
Forms !GameForm!Move2Payoffs = Forms !GameForm!Move2Payoffs + DPayoff
Forms!GameForm!Move2Average = Forms !GameForm!Move2Payoffs /
Forms! GameForm!Move2Turns
Elself DefMove = "D3" Then
DefMoveH = "Integrity,Confidentiality Defense"
Forms!GameForm!Move3Turns = Forms !GameForm!Move3Turns + 1
Forms!GameForm!Move3Payoffs = Forms!GameForm!Move3Payoffs + DPayoff
Forms!GameForm!Move3Average = Forms!GameForm!Move3Payoffs /
Forms! GameForm! Move3Turns
Elself DefMove = "D4" Then
DefMoveH = "Availability Defense"
Forms!GameForm!Move4Turns = Forms !GameForm!Move4Turns + 1
Forms! GameForm! Move4Payoffs = Forms!GameForm!Move4Payoffs + DPayoff
Forms!GameForm!Move4Average = Forms!GameForm!Move4Payoffs /
Forms! GameForm! Move4Turns

Elself DefMove = "D5" Then
DefMoveH = "Availability,Confidentiality Defence"
Forms!GameForm!Move5Tums = Forms!GameForm!Move5Turns + 1
Forms!GameForm!Move5Payoffs = Forms!GameForm!Move5Payoffs + DPayoff
Forms !GameForm!Move5 Average = Forms!GameForm!Move5Payoffs /
Forms!GameForm!Move5Turns
Elself DefMove = "D6" Then
DefMoveH = "Confidentiality Defense"
Forms !GameForm!Move6Turns = Forms !GameForm!Move6Turns + 1
Forms !GameForm!Move6Payoffs = Forms !GameForm!Move6Payoffs + DPayoff
Forms!GameForm!Move6Average = Forms !GameForm!Move6Payoffs /
Forms! GameForm! MoveöTurns
Elself DefMove = "D7" Then
DefMoveH = "Integrity,Availability,Confidentiality Defense"
Forms! GameForm! Move7Turns = Forms!GameForm!Move7Turns + 1
Forms! GameForm! Move7Payoffs = Forms !GameForm!Move7Payoffs + DPayoff
Forms! GameForm! Move7 Average = Forms!GameForm!Move7Payoffs /
Forms! GameForm! Mo ve7Turns
Elself DefMove = "D8" Then
DefMoveH = "None"
Forms!GameForm!Move8Turns = Forms!GameForm!Move8Turns + 1
Forms!GameForm!Move8Payoffs = Forms!GameForm!Move8Payoffs + DPayoff
Forms!GameForm!Move8Average = Forms!GameForm!Move8Payoffs /
Forms! GameForm! Move8Turns
End If
Query = "SELECT * FROM History WHERE MatchID = " & Match
Set HistoryQuery = CurrentDb.CreateQueryDef("FindHistory" & SubjectBox, Query)
Set HistoryRecord = HistoryQuery. OpenRecordset
HistoryRecord.FindFirst "[Turn] = " & Turn
While HistoryRecord.EditMode = dbEditlnProgress
Wend
HistoryRecord.Edit
HistoryRecord("DefendAction") = DefMoveH
HistoryRecord("DefendPayoff') = DPayoff
HistoryRecord("AttackAction") = AttMoveH
HistoryRecord.Update
HistoryRecord.Close
DefendHistory.Requery
DeleteQuery:
CurrentDb.QueryDefs.Delete "FindHistory" & SubjectBox
CurrentDb.QueryDefs.Refresh
GoTo Out
ErrorHandler:
If Err .Number = 3167 Then
Resume DeleteQuery
Elself Err.Number = 3012 Then
CurrentDb.QueryDefs.Delete "FindHistory" & SubjectBox
CurrentDb.QueryDefs.Refresh
Resume Begin
Else
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BlownUp = BlownUp + 1
Set ErrorRecord = CurrenfDb.OpenRecordset("Errors", DB_OPEN_DYNASET)
With ErrorRecord
.AddNew
!BlownUpCount = BlownUp
!ErrorDesc = Err.Description
lErrorNumber = Err.Number
.Update
End With
Resume Begin
End If
Out:
End Sub
Public Function ConvertMove(Move As String, Defender As Boolean) As String
'Converts Move from User's Name to Al/Dl Notation

If Move = "Integrity Defense" Then
ConvertMove = "Dl"
Elself Move = "Integrity,Availability Defense" Then
ConvertMove = "D2"
Elself Move = "Integrity,Confidentiality Defense" Then
ConvertMove = "D3"
Elself Move = "Availability Defense" Then
ConvertMove = "D4"
Elself Move = "Availability,Confidentiality Defense" Then
ConvertMove = "D5"
Elself Move = "Confidentiality Defense" Then
ConvertMove = "D6"
Elself Move = "Integrity,Availability,Confidentiality Defense" Then
ConvertMove = "D7"
Else
ConvertMove = "D8"
End If

End Function

Public Function CalcBudget(Move As String, Multi As Boolean) As Currency
'Calculates available budget based on strategy cost and new income
Dim Income As Currency, Cost As Currency
Begin:
Income = IncomeBox
CalcBudget = True

If Move = "Integrity Defense" Then
Cost = Strategy ICostBox
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If Cost <= BudgetBox Then
BudgetBox = BudgetBox + Income - Cost
Else
GoTo NoFunds
End If
Elself Move = "Integrity,Availability Defense" Then
Cost = Strategy ICostBox + Srrategy2CostBox
If Cost <= BudgetBox Then
BudgetBox = BudgetBox + Income - Cost
Else
GoTo NoFunds
End If
Elself Move = "Integrity,Confidentiality Defense" Then
Cost = Strategy ICostBox + Strategy3CostBox
If Cost <= BudgetBox Then
BudgetBox = BudgetBox + Income - Cost
Else
GoTo NoFunds
End If
Elself Move = "Availability Defense" Then
Cost = Strategy2CostBox
If Cost <= BudgetBox Then
BudgetBox = BudgetBox + Income - Cost
Else
GoTo NoFunds
End If
Elself Move = "Availability.Confidentiality Defense" Then
Cost = Strategy2CostBox + Strategy3CostBox
If Cost <= BudgetBox Then
BudgetBox = BudgetBox + Income - Cost
Else
GoTo NoFunds
End If
Elself Move = "Confidentiality Defense" Then
Cost = Strategy3CosfBox
If Cost <= BudgetBox Then
BudgetBox = BudgetBox + Income - Cost
Else
GoTo NoFunds
End If
Elself Move = "Integrity Availability,Confidentiality Defense" Then
Cost = Strategy ICostBox + Strategy2CostBox + Strategy3CostBox
If Cost <= BudgetBox Then
BudgetBox = BudgetBox + Income - Cost
Else
GoTo NoFunds
End If
Else
Cost = 0
If Cost <= BudgetBox Then
BudgetBox = BudgetBox + Income - Cost
Else
GoTo No Funds
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End If
End If
GoTo Out
No_Funds:
MsgBox "Insuficiant Funds; Please Select Diferent Move!"
CalcBudget = False
If Multi = True Then
MultiMoveBox.SetFocus
Else
SingleMoveBox.SefFocus
End If
GoTo Out
Out:
End Function
Private Sub MultiMoveBox_Change()
If MultiMoveBox = "Integrity Defense" Then
MoveCost = StrategylCostBox
Elself MultiMoveBox = "Availability Defense" Then
MoveCost = Strategy2CostBox
Elself MultiMoveBox = "Confidentiality Defense" Then
MoveCost = Strategy3CostBox
Elself MultiMoveBox = "Integrity.Availability Defense" Then
MoveCost = StrategylCostBox + Strategy2CostBox
Elself MultiMoveBox = "Integrity,Confidentiality Defense" Then
MoveCost = StrategylCostBox + Strategy3CostBox
Elself MultiMoveBox = "Availability,Confidentiality Defense" Then
MoveCost = Strategy2CostBox + Strategy3CostBox
Elself MultiMoveBox = "Integrity, Availability,Confidentiality Defense" Then
MoveCost = StrategylCostBox + Strategy2CostBox + Strategy3CostBox
Else: MoveCost = 0
End If
End Sub
Private Sub SingleMoveBox_Change()
If SingleMoveBox = "Integrity Defense" Then
MoveCost = StrategylCostBox
Elself SingleMoveBox = "Availability Defense" Then
MoveCost = Strategy2CostBox
Elself SingleMoveBox = "Confidentiality Defense" Then
MoveCost = Strategy3CostBox
Else: MoveCost = 0
End If
End Sub
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